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Profits at what cost?

Eve Moore — Sat, 08 Aug 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Dear reader,

This week, our summer podcast series continued with an episode exploring the financial incentives driving AI-generated hate on social media. We also examined why Palantir is accused of aggressive tax avoidance in Europe, looked at how global aid cuts are deepening the hunger crisis, and revisited one of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office’s (EPPO) biggest fraud cases. Elsewhere, our partners investigated the Belgian architects’ watchdog and the protection of whistleblowers.

Here’s your weekly investigative briefing.

From us:

Summer Series Podcast | Profits, not politics, behind AI hate boom

Who profits from AI-generated racist content? The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) journalist Niamh McIntyre spent months tracing the people flooding social media with hateful AI posts. What she found challenged her assumptions: many looked very different from what she expected, and some weren’t even aware that the content they were profiting from was racist or Islamophobic.

In the latest episode of our summer podcast series, FTM’s Emma du Chatinier and Lise Witteman speak with Niamh about the financial incentives behind this hateful online ecosystem, Meta’s role in rewarding it, and what it reveals about the internet we’re creating.

Listen or watch the full episode and follow the podcast here, we’ll release another episode next Thursday!

Tech giant Palantir accused of ‘aggressive tax avoidance’ at Europe’s expense

Palantir makes billions from government contracts around the world, including across Europe. But European trade unions say there’s one thing that doesn’t add up: the amount it pays back in tax. Last year, the controversial tech firm paid an effective corporation tax rate of just 1.4% on its global profits.

As taxpayers continue to fund Palantir’s growth, critics argue the public deserves to know how a company so dependent on public contracts contributes so little in return. So how does it do it?

Hunger crisis grows while major donors retreat

The global hunger crisis is intensifying due to war and climate disasters. Yet, instead of stepping up to help, the world’s biggest economies are executing unprecedented budget cuts. In the coming years, this could lead to 22.6 million additional deaths – a crisis experts are calling a disaster in slow motion.

The US drove 70% of aid cuts in 2025, while Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the UK also slashed spending. China has given nothing to the UN World Food Programme this year, and India has yet to match its economic weight.

Ski racer swindled hundreds of millions to splash on cars, watches, and property

This summer marks five years since the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) was established. What cases have the prosecutors taken on so far? We’re exploring some of the most remarkable ones to cross their desks.

First up: a retired Italian ski racer who swapped the slopes for shell companies, EU pandemic funds, and luxury cars. The €600 million scheme landed Alexander Mair in a Milan prison cell – and exposed just how vulnerable Europe’s recovery billions were to fraud.

The whistleblower case shaking Belgium’s architecture sector

Apache investigated claims that the Belgian architects’ watchdog failed to act on repeated misconduct reports by certain architects. Bruno Covemaecker, a building consultant and protected whistleblower, said he reported practices including falsified site inspection reports and changes to contracts and fees that could affect homeowners. Covemaecker claims his complaints were repeatedly dismissed. He was taken to court by architects he had reported and was acquitted in one criminal case. The investigation raises questions about whether Belgium’s complaints system does enough to protect both homeowners and whistleblowers.

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Video of the week:

Shell’s Bahamas trading office made $6.2 billion in profit between 2018 and 2023 – with just 37 people on staff and a 0% tax rate. Leaked documents analysed by SOMO and Leiden University show that’s roughly 104 times more profit per employee than Shell’s company‑wide average. It’s the same crude oil Shell trades everywhere else, just routed through a subsidiary that doesn’t pay tax on the profits

🔗 Read the full investigation here

Until next week

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Podcast | Profits, not politics, behind AI hate boom

Emma du Chatinier, Lise Witteman, Niamh McIntyre — Thu, 06 Aug 2026 04:05:00 GMT

In this episode: Journalist Niamh McIntyre went deep into the world of hateful content on social media, investigating the people posting so-called AI slop. She was shocked: many of the creators were not at all what you might expect. And some weren’t even aware that the videos they were profiting from were racist or Islamophobic.

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Emma and Lise speak to Niamh about the rise of AI-generated misinformation, the financial incentives driving its creation, and how Meta is to blame. “These content creators aren’t an anomaly. They’re producing the internet that Big Tech companies and AI companies want.”

EU threatens Georgia’s power supply with sanctions on Russian company

Nick de Jager — Thu, 06 Aug 2026 04:00:00 GMT

A move by the European Union to sanction one of Russia’s biggest energy companies could have severe consequences for Georgia’s power supply, experts say.

The European Union added Russian energy company Inter RAO to its sanctions list two weeks ago. According to Brussels, the company is one of the country’s largest energy companies and “plays a significant role in an important economic sector in Russia”. Two of its major shareholders are state-controlled.

This is not the first time Inter RAO has come on the EU’s radar. Since 2022, it has sanctioned four people connected to the company.

Yet, it had been reluctant to sanction the company as such until now.

“Usually, a delay in imposing sanctions simply comes down to the EU’s own self-interest,” said Heleen over de Linden, a lawyer specialised in sanctions.

The EU has been shying away from imposing sanctions on grid operators as they have a direct impact on people’s lives. In addition, Inter RAO was still active in Finland and the Baltic states at the beginning of the war.

I previously said that this package was mainly for show, but nothing could be further from the truth

While Inter RAO stopped operating in the Baltics in 2022, it still provides electricity to Georgia through subsidiaries in the Netherlands, Georgian media reported last month. Now that the company has been hit with sanctions, it could become more difficult for it to maintain its network – and potentially risk instability in the long run.

Although democratic backsliding has put EU accession talks on hold, Georgia is an important strategic partner for the European Union in the Caucasus region. Energy is among the most important trades, with Georgian oil pipelines linking the Caspian Sea basin to Turkey and the Black Sea.

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The bloc’s most recent sanctions package has been likened to Swiss cheese, having been watered down from an earlier version because of resistance from individual member states to draft packages.

But the inclusion of Inter RAO was, according to Over de Linden, a powerful move.

“I previously said that this package was mainly for show, but nothing could be further from the truth. Inter RAO is an enormous and important company,” she said.

“The main problem at the moment is the long-term stability of the grid”

Together, Inter RAO’s Dutch subsidiaries have some €223 million of assets. Inter RAO itself made a net profit of some €1.3 billion in 2025.

Being sanctioned means that the company’s assets are frozen – unless the relevant authorities have granted an exemption – and that it cannot pay out dividends, hire staff, or provide financing. It also means that it cannot do transactionsin euros.

The Dutch foreign affairs ministry did “not comment on specific companies”.

Problems in Georgia

Sanctioning Inter RAO does not come without risks. That’s because two of its Dutch letterbox companies play a crucial role in Georgia’s energy supply.

Telmico and Telasi, two energy companies that split from a single utility provider following market reforms, operate effectively the entire electricity grid of the country’s capital, Tbilisi. They are both largely owned by Inter RAO: the latter’s subsidiary Silk Road Holdings owns about 75% of both of them.

Inter RAO also – via Dutch company Gardabani Holdings – also wholly owns hydroelectric power stations Khramhesi I and Khramhesi II, which generate 3% to 4% of Georgia’s total electricity.

The Russia Files

There’s a war raging on European soil. What consequences does Putin’s war against Ukraine have for Europe?

The biggest risk, according to Georgian economist Giorgi Kepuladze, founder of the Georgian NGO Society and Banks, was that the power supply could become unstable. That’s because, he said, neither Telmico nor Telasi could now purchase components for the grid from abroad.

“They could flip a switch at any moment and cut off Tbilisi’s energy supply”

These companies could no longer source European equipment, spare parts, software upgrades, or technical consulting services, Kepuludze said.

“The main problem at the moment is not the distribution of electricity, but the long-term stability of the grid,” he said.

A spokesperson for the European Commission said that the “implementation of EU sanctions is the responsibility of Member States”.

With its sanctions, the EU could be trying to force Georgia to move away from electricity providers controlled by the Russian state, said sanctions lawyer Over de Linden.

Erekle Pirveli, who specialises in accounting and financing at Tbilisi-based Caucasus University, echoed the assessment. Such a move could be justifiable, he said, arguing that if Georgia was to find itself in armed conflict with Russia again, Russia could use the power it holds over the electricity grid to its advantage.

“They could flip a switch at any moment and cut off Tbilisi’s energy supply,” he said.

But that plan might remain a pipedream for a while to come.

“Nobody believes that Inter RAO is simply going to give the shares to Georgia,” he said. Profits from the Georgia-based companies weren’t significant enough for Inter CAO, and with the sanctions they couldn’t receive any dividends anyway, according to Pirveli.

“These assets serve a different purpose,” he said, adding that Russia was trying to strengthen its control over these power lines.

Earlier this year, Inter RAO made bids to buy the remaining shares in Telmico and Telasi.

Inter RAO did not respond to requests for comment.

Long-running investigation

It appears that Inter RAO had been expecting to be sanctioned.

The subsidiary RAO Intertech has had a highly unusual note attached to it since 2023: “As part of the monitoring of sanctions compliance, a further investigation is taking place into this company’s involvement with one or more persons or entities on the European Union’s sanctions list,” a document filed by the company in the Dutch commercial register, dated 14 September 2023," shows

Since then, Inter RAO has virtually stripped Inter RAO Holding – another company in which it held significant assets – of its assets. It initially held $88 million in assets; now it holds just $8.6 million.

While being investigated, Inter RAO also changed the ownership structure of the Dutch letterbox companies that held the Georgian assets. They now have a new direct shareholder, IRG Energy Holding FZ-LLC, a company based in Dubai. However, the Telmico and Telasi 2025 annual reports still clearly state that the ultimate beneficial owner is Inter RAO. According to sanctions lawyer Over de Linden, such ownership structure changes are considered “a red flag that should be further investigated”.

By imposing these sanctions, the European Union is forcing Georgia to make a decisive choice regarding its energy supply, said economist Kepuladze.

“Ultimately, this situation forces a resolution to a long-standing vulnerability: the presence of Russian state ownership in Georgia’s primary utility infrastructure,” he said.

Tech giant Palantir accused of ‘aggressive tax avoidance’ at Europe’s expense

Sebastiaan Brommersma, Salsabil Fayed, Henk Willem Smits — Wed, 05 Aug 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What’s the news?

US technology giant Palantir had an effective global corporation tax rate of 1.4% in 2025, paying only $22.7 million despite reporting $1.6 billion in pre-tax profit.
The firm achieves this through strategies that shift profits generated in Europe to the US, where they are taxed at very low rates or not at all, a new study found.

Why does it matter?

European trade unions are outraged because many EU governments are Palantir clients, from Germany and the Netherlands to the UK. They argue that the company profits from taxpayers’ money while contributing little back through corporation tax.
Critics also say that Palantir’s tax arrangements make it harder for European firms to compete, reinforcing the continent’s dependence on US technology.

How was this investigated?

The Centre for International Corporate Tax Accountability and Research (CICTAR) analysed Palantir’s public financial records on behalf of European trade unions to map the company’s tax structure.
CICTAR produced a report together with the European Federation of Public Service Unions, and it was shared with Follow the Money ahead of publication.
FTM analysed the findings and interviewed experts on the issue.

Less than two cents on every dollar.

That was US tech giant Palantir’s effective global corporation tax rate in 2025, according to a new study.

Palantir reported $1.66 billion in pre-tax profit last year but paid just $22.7 million in corporation tax, found the Centre for International Corporate Tax Accountability and Research (CICTAR).

Its effective tax rate therefore amounted to a mere 1.4%.

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That is far below the 15% global minimum corporation tax rate agreed by more than 145 countries under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s framework. The United States, however, has negotiated an exemption from the agreement.

Founded in 2003 – in the aftermath of 9/11 – by tech billionaire and Trump ally Peter Thiel, Palantir has become a major supplier of data analytics software to governments worldwide. Its tech is used in defence, intelligence, policing, and even healthcare.

Yet the company is facing growing scrutiny over alleged involvement in human rights violations – such as collaborating with the Israeli military and helping the United States to crack down on irregular migration through Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

There are also widespread concerns over the risks its technology could pose to European security.

“It is unacceptable that Palantir is evading its social responsibility through opaque arrangements”

The new study – carried out by CICTAR on behalf of the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) – examined Palantir’s tax structure in light of its contracts with European governments, including those in France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK.

Although some of those contracts are currently under review, taxpayers across the continent are still helping fund a company that pays hardly anything in tax itself, according to CICTAR.

“A clear pattern of aggressive tax avoidance has emerged in almost every country where it operates,” the report said.

Marieke Manschot, an official at the Dutch trade union FNV – which is part of EPSU – and board member of Public Services International, said the findings raise serious concerns about Palantir’s tax affairs.

“It is unacceptable that Palantir is evading its social responsibility through opaque arrangements,” she told FTM. “Palantir pays little or no tax, whilst in the countries where it operates it does make use of public services such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure.”

“The bill therefore ends up being footed by the ordinary taxpayer,” Manschot added.

Palantir provided a general statement, saying that its public and private sector partnerships across Europe “reinforce a common commitment to the values that strengthen European society”.

“Customers use our software to enhance their capacity to operate effectively, with full control over their data and capacity for sovereign decision making,” a spokesperson said. “Institutions are stronger, more effective and more accountable when they use Palantir’s software to support their mandates.

Shortly before publication, the company provided a follow-up response.

“Palantir is a global company with a presence in over 25 countries. In 2025, the substantial majority of our revenue and profitability was driven by our US business,” it said. “Our tax position in each jurisdiction reflects the level of economic activity there, and we meet our tax obligations in every market in which we operate.”

Public company, private control

Governments and companies that contract Palantir are not only buying software, but “are also buying into a specific ideology and a disturbing world view,” CICTAR’s report said.

The research centre pointed, among other things, to its collaboration with the Israeli military and the controversial views of Thiel – Palantir’s chairman – and Alex Karp – its co-founder and CEO.

In a 2009 essay, Thiel wrote that he no longer believed “that freedom and democracy are compatible”. Karp has claimed that some cultures are superior to others, and acknowledged that Palantir's technology is used in military operations that result in people being killed.

The company itself published a 22-point manifesto on its social media channels this year, based on a book by Karp. It argues that some cultures are “dysfunctional” and that liberal democracies can survive only through “hard power” enabled by software.

Palantir’s governance structure ensures that Thiel and Karp retain control over the company, despite its public listing in 2020, according to CICTAR. Through a unique shareholding structure, the founders continue to dominate decision-making at a company that plays an increasingly important role in Europe’s security and critical infrastructure.

Jill Fisch – professor of corporate law at the University of Pennsylvania – and Dorothy Lund – professor of corporate law at Columbia Law School – said they had never seen a governance structure like Palantir’s, with a variable share arrangement via a voting trust mechanism.

Lund added that in conventional corporate structures, shareholders appoint independent directors to provide oversight of management. At Palantir, however, chief executive Karp and president and secretary Stephen Cohen both sit on the board, with co-founder Thiel serving as chairman.

As a result, Lund said, Palantir’s shareholders should not expect critical independent oversight.

“You can essentially expect to have a board that’s going to be very much aligned with what these controlling shareholders want, and what management wants,” she told FTM.

In response, Palantir said it deliberately leaves leadership and control in the hands of its founders to preserve the company’s culture, encourage risk-taking and foster innovation.

The spokesperson said “it is an essential part of how we think about Palantir and how we operate – we are not a conventional company”.

How Palantir shifts profits

The reason behind Palantir’s low corporation tax bill, according to CICTAR, lies partly in the way the company has structured its global operations.

The research centre found that many European clients pay Palantir directly through its US headquarters rather than local subsidiaries.

As a result, profits generated from these contracts are taxed in the United States, where Palantir benefits from a range of exemptions and tax breaks introduced under President Donald Trump for US multinationals.

The tech behemoth uses various strategies to facilitate this arrangement, according to the study.

For example, CICTAR says Palantir’s own financial records show that the activities of its offices in Germany and the UK are carried out for the benefit of the company’s US headquarters.

As a result, contracts won in those nations are settled in the US. European branches receive a much smaller payment from Palantir’s head office in return, lowering their profits, CICTAR said.

Palantir’s tax structure is different in Spain, however, according to the research centre. The local office pays a substantial licence fee to the US headquarters. This expense – which amounts to more than 70% of the revenue generated – reduces the profits subject to taxation by Spain.

According to EPSU, Palantir’s taxable income is reduced further through the way it compensates employees, which is a practice common among tech companies.

Stock-based compensation is a form of remuneration in which employees receive part of their pay in equity, such as company shares or share options.

Applied across hundreds or thousands of employees, this form of compensation can significantly reduce a company’s taxable profits. According to CICTAR, Palantir uses this practice not only in the US but also in European nations including Spain, Norway, and the UK.

CICTAR does not claim that any of the tax arrangements are illegal.

According to Matt Gardner, senior research fellow at the Institute of Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), there are question marks surrounding Palantir’s strategy.

‘We know that Palantir has accumulated billions of dollars worth of tax breaks related to R&D and stock options that will likely let them sharply reduce their income taxes for years going forward,” he told FTM by email.

“On its face this all seems ‘perfectly legal’, although I think it’s important to note that Palantir last year claimed $45 million of tax breaks the company believes would be reversed on audit,” he wrote. “So it appears to be well versed in living in the grey areas of tax law.”

Europe’s digital sovereignty dilemma

Palantir’s low corporation tax bill last year was no one-off.

The company paid just over $21 million in corporation tax worldwide in 2024, according to its annual report. Given it made pre-tax profits of $489 million that year, according to CICTAR, its effective global tax rate was 4%.

In the United Kingdom, Palantir paid £2.1 million in tax in 2024, giving it an effective tax rate of 8.2%, openDemocracy revealed in June. That is more than double the group’s global effective tax rate that year, but the comparison is not as straightforward as it seems.

After all, much of the revenue generated in the UK is booked directly through the US parent company, reducing the profits reported by the British subsidiary.

Even so, Palantir’s effective UK tax rate remains well below the OECD’s 15% global minimum rate.

If US companies also enjoy substantial tax advantages, it becomes very difficult for European alternatives to compete

In Germany and Spain, the company’s effective tax rates in 2024 were higher – 31% and 26.2% respectively – CICTAR found.

But because a substantial share of revenue was funnelled to the US, the actual tax paid was low: €641,000 in Germany and €147,000 in Spain.

France is the exception.

According to the study, Palantir paid €1.6 million in corporation tax there at an effective rate of 33% in 2024, after national tax authorities intervened to ensure that revenue generated in France was recorded by the local subsidiary rather than in the US.

No data was available for the Netherlands, according to CICTAR. This is because Palantir’s Amsterdam office is a branch of the European headquarters in London and therefore does not publish separate annual accounts.

According to Jesse Six Dijkstra of Digitale Doetank, a Dutch advisory firm focused on digital sovereignty, the research highlights Europe’s dependence on American technology.

“Reducing that dependence is hard enough as it is, but if US companies also enjoy substantial tax advantages, it becomes very difficult for European alternatives to compete,” said Six Dijkstra, an advisor at the firm who was a member of the Dutch parliament from 2023 to 2025.

Brussels is working on directives that would allow governments to consider digital sovereignty and social responsibility in tender processes, he said, making companies that do not contribute sufficiently to the European economy less likely to win contracts.

However, whether this would apply to Palantir in practice depends largely on whether a suitable alternative exists, said Six Dijkstra.

“But, as a government, you have at the very least a moral duty to take into account the extent to which companies contribute to broader prosperity,” he added.

Hunger crisis grows while major donors retreat

Ties Gijzel, Jan Daalder — Tue, 04 Aug 2026 04:00:00 GMT

From Palestinians struggling to survive in conflict-ravaged Gaza to Yemenis uprooted by years of civil war, hunger is worsening across some of the world’s most fragile regions.

The United Nations has sounded the alarm – warning that factors from conflict in the Middle East to climate shocks are leaving ever-more people without enough to eat.

In a recent report, it said acute food insecurity is set to rise for millions living in 13 “hunger hotspots”.

According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), global hunger eased for the third consecutive year in 2025. But cuts to development aid, combined with crises such as the war in Iran, are putting global food security under more pressure.

One of the biggest blows came from the United States in early 2025, where the Trump administration effectively dismantled the US Agency for International Development (USAID) – halting much of its foreign aid programme.

To compound matters, several European countries have also made sweeping cuts to their development cooperation budgets.

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The squeeze is placing growing strain on the UN World Food Programme (WFP) – whose funding has fallen sharply – along with other aid agencies working to tackle global hunger.

In interviews with Follow the Money, three food experts expressed deep concern about the trajectory.

“I fear that worse is to come,” said Jean-Martin Bauer, director of food security and nutrition analysis at the WFP.

Major donors pull out

Never before has the global development aid budget shrunk as sharply as it did in 2025.

Official development assistance (ODA) dropped by 23.1% in 2025 to $174.3 billion.

A further decline of 6.9% is projected this year, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).That would bring ODA down to $152 billion – its lowest level since 2014.

The Global Food Crisis

Is the global food system on the brink of collapse? Pressure on the global food system is mounting. Energy and fertiliser costs have surged, driving up food production costs around...

The United States accounted for 70% of the overall decline in 2025, with Germany, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom also among the largest contributors to the aid cuts.

Washington also hugely scaled back its contribution to the WFP – from $4.4 billion in 2024 to $2 billion last year.

The pullback is not just confined to Western donors.

In a refugee camp in Yemen, a child waits for a meal of boiled tree leaves.

China – one of the world’s largest economies – has contributed very little to the WFP for years. It donated just $19.1 million in 2025. This year, it has given nothing so far.

Brazil provided a meagre $3.3 million last year, and India only $2.3 million. By contrast, the small Caribbean nation of Haiti provided $19.7 million to the WFP last year – despite being classified as a hunger hotspot.

Gang violence has fuelled a deepening humanitarian crisis, displacing more than 1.5 million people and leaving more than half of the population without enough food.

In 2022, the WFP enjoyed a record year for donor contributions with nearly $14.2 billion. Yet last year, they fell by 54% to $6.5 billion. By the end of July this year, that figure had dropped to $3.7 billion.

“To be able to help everyone, we actually need $13 billion,” said Bauer of the WFP.

“All major donors have cut their assistance. There’s less capacity on the ground to support people in need,” he added.

Unprecedented plight

The number of people who need assistance is staggering.

At least 266 million people across 47 nations faced high levels of acute food insecurity last year, according to a major annual UN report on hunger crises.

And about 1.4 million were on the brink of starvation across six countries and territories – more than nine times as many as the 155,000 recorded in 2016 – the report found.

The consequences of the aid cuts are already being felt around the globe.

“The safety net provided by the WFP is getting weaker”

In Uganda, more than 1 million refugees received no food aid from the WFP last year. In Niger, assistance has been cut back to 600,000 people, leaving 900,000 without support.

Meanwhile, in Syria, the UN agency expects to halve emergency food aid this year.

Ultimately, the funding shortfall could contribute to as many as 22.6 million additional deaths worldwide by 2030, including 5.4 million children under the age of five, the WFP has warned.

‘Slow-motion disaster’

The cuts are also undermining the WFP’s ability to prepare for future crises.

Without sufficient funding, the agency cannot build up emergency food stockpiles or invest in the data needed to identify the people who are most vulnerable. This, too, will cause the number of deaths from starvation to rise in the coming years, according to the WFP.

“The safety net provided by the WFP is getting weaker,” said Timothy Lang, emeritus professor of food policy at City St George’s, University of London.

Having spent more than five decades researching the global food system, he described the current situation as unprecedented.

People queue for food at a refugee camp in South Sudan.

“The UN’s involvement in the food system grew out of the optimism of the post-World War II era. We are now seeing it under attack and shrinking,” Lang added.

Bart de Steenhuijsen Piters, a food systems researcher at Wageningen Social & Economic Research (WSER) in the Netherlands, shared Lang’s view that countries should – at the very least – invest in reinforcing the WFP’s safety net.

“I simply believe that is an ethical necessity for humanity,” he said.

However, Bauer of the WFP is sceptical that things will improve – and is increasingly fearful for the future.

We are facing a slow-motion disaster that could lead to a lost generation

The global food crisis is putting millions of hungry people at risk while also threatening social stability and national security in wealthier countries, he explained.

Possible extreme weather events as a result of a strong El Niño and continued trade disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz add further pressure on global food security.

Yet the response so far has been fragmented, short-term, and ineffective, Bauer added.

“Our global food security is too important to be managed on a crisis-by-crisis basis,” he said.

“We are facing a slow-motion disaster that could lead to a lost generation – children who have grown up not knowing where their next meal will come from, disillusioned with or even hostile towards a society indifferent to the suffering of its own people.”

Ski racer swindled hundreds of millions to splash on cars, watches, and property

Peter Teffer — Mon, 03 Aug 2026 04:00:00 GMT

In the world of winter sports, two retired racers share almost the same name.

One is Austrian: snowboarder Alexander Maier, a World Cup podium finisher now working at the ski school run by his more famous brother, Hermann “Herminator” Maier. The other is Italian: alpine skier Alexander Mair, without an “e”, whose racing career fizzled out in the 1990s – and whose post-ski life has since collapsed into fraud, seized sports cars, and a prison cell in Milan.

After a somewhat underwhelming career, then, things have gone rapidly downhill for Mair: Last year, he was sentenced to nearly four years for subsidy fraud, alongside three accomplices convicted of running a criminal organisation, laundering money, and forging documents.

It is a case that, on its own, might read as a curiosity – a once-promising athlete gone wrong. But it also tells the story of the systematic attempts to plunder EU funds. In this case, Mair and his network defrauded almost €2 million of the bloc’s largest-ever stimulus package – the €577 billion COVID-19 recovery fund – and pocketed hundreds of millions of euros more through tax reliefs.

This is also the story of how, five years after the office was called into life, the European prosecutor’s office (EPPO) is racing to claw the money back.

Summer series: European fraud

With EPPO having turned five years old in June, we’re examining some of the cases they’ve investigated. This is the first installment of our five-part summer series on fraud in Europe. Stay tuned for more in the coming weeks.

Easy to cheat

The recovery fund was called into life almost at the same time as the EPPO. Established during the pandemic, the fund was set up to repair economic damage caused by lockdowns.

Unlike most EU subsidy programs, the fund didn’t pay out against verified invoices or receipts. Instead, member states submitted reform plans, and once Brussels judged that promised reforms had been delivered, the money flowed – with no direct link between funds disbursed and costs actually incurred.

This was a vulnerability from the start – and, in articles in 2022 and 2024, Follow the Money’s #RecoveryFiles proved that transparency for the funds has been lagging far behind for years.

The clock is ticking

EU countries have until the end of this month to submit payment requests to the European Commission. The latter then has until the end of the year to check whether it believes that the conditions have been met.

The Commission can dole out some €577 billion euros. As it doesn’t have that money itself, it is borrowing on financial markets, for which the repayment period runs from 2028 until 2058. Of that maximum, up to €217 billion is available to EU countries in the form of low-interest loans, meaning that part will have to be paid back by the individual member states who used them.

The EU Files

What is transpiring within the European Union? What are the goals and aspirations of the EU, and how is the budget allocated?

The EPPO is tasked, amongst others, with controlling exactly this budget line – and earlier this year, it became clear just how susceptible the recovery funds are to fraud: the EPPO estimates that fraudsters have caused some €5 billion in damages.

Mair’s case, uncovered through the EPPO’s sweeping 2024 arrest and seizure operation “Resilient Crime”, shows exactly how that could happen. Mair and two others were arrested in Slovakia on 4 April 2024, while the fourth suspect was arrested in Italy.

According to the Milan court ruling, Mair and his three associates funneled fraudulently obtained subsidies and low-interest loans – approved by the Italian state agency Simest on the basis of falsified balance sheets – through a web of shell companies.

Neither the EPPO nor the Commission provided further details on how exactly the scheme was connected to the recovery funds.

The money moved to bank accounts in Slovakia and Spain, then on to China, and converted to cash through “illicit financial services offered by the Chinese communities of the main Italian cities”. What came back was spent on cars, watches, and apartments.

The court judgement shows what lifestyle the scheme financed.

Investigators confiscated a Porsche Panamera worth €60,000, three Audis worth almost €130,000 combined, and a Skoda Superb, along with more than €200,000 funneled into an online gambling account, plus cash and bank balances across three countries.

Co-defendants lost an Audi registered in Slovakia and two apartments near Verona.

With this scheme, the fraudsters weren’t the only ones to benefit from the EU’s post-pandemic fund: in its annual report, the EPPO identified some 2,000 suspects across Europe. Many of them are in Italy, which had received some €166 billion of the €428 billion disbursed so far.

A bigger network

In total, Mair and his associates managed to embezzle more than €600 million. The direct loss to the EU fund itself was just €1.7 million – the sum extracted through forged loan applications.

The far bigger damage, roughly €600 million, came from tax relief the fraudsters claimed by citing construction work that was never carried out – a hit absorbed by the Italian treasury, not Brussels.

A spokesperson for the European Commission said that “Italy has taken action to recover the funds affected by fraud” and that “the alleged fraud scheme does not, as such, give rise to a financial risk for the Union budget”.

But that doesn’t mean the story is done: prosecutors say they were only a fragment of a much larger operation – 25 additional suspects are currently standing trial in Milan, with a partial verdict expected in October.

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And the pipeline of new cases hasn’t slowed either.

This summer, EPPO disclosed that Italian tax investigators are examining the suspected embezzlement of roughly €1 million from the recovery fund by seven suspects using forged company documents. That scheme was partly disrupted when a €500,000 payment was blocked before it went out, and partly unwound after three suspects and one company repaid €270,000 to the Italian state.

These suspects might look at Mair and his gang and conclude that cooperating with the authorities could be their best option available.

Mair and his three co-defendants received reduced sentences for cooperating and accepting a settlement; an appeal by one was rejected.

The maximum sentence they could have gotten for the worse offence, money laundering, was eight years in prison. Their jail sentences ranged from two years and nine months to almost four years.

Small mercies followed the ruling: a seized motorbike was returned to co-defendant Zhanna Zozulya, and Mair got back a Cartier Pasha watch – typically worth several thousands of euros – confiscated from an apartment in Innsbruck. Whether prison rules will allow him to wear it in his cell to count down the remainder of his sentence is unclear.

Risky business, deadly consequences

Eve Moore — Sat, 01 Aug 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Dear reader,

This week marks the launch of our new summer podcast series, revisiting major investigations with the journalists behind them. We begin with the murder of Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak and the reporting that preceded it. We also revealed details about the Canadian AI researcher suspected of spying on NATO, and examined Estonia’s controversial new arms investment. Elsewhere, our partners followed the money behind the AI weapons boom and investigated the billion-euro energy drink industry, from lobbying to industry-funded research.

Here’s your weekly investigative briefing.

From us:

Podcast | They killed the journalist, but not the story

Investigative journalist Ján Kuciak paid the ultimate price for exposing how money and power collide in Slovakia. But his murder ignited a movement to finish what he started. In the first episode of our summer podcast series, FTM’s Emma du Chatinier and Lise Witteman sit down with Lukáš Diko of the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak to discuss Kuciak’s legacy, the fallout of his murder, and the challenges facing investigative journalism in Slovakia today.

Listen or watch the full episode and follow the podcast here

Espionage at NATO: this is the suspect who was arrested last week

For a year, she was an intern at the military heart of NATO. But last week, Canadian AI researcher Claire Z. was arrested on suspicion of spying. Intelligence services had taken notice after she asked an unusual number of sensitive questions and behaved in other ways that were deemed abnormal.

Z. worked in the IT department and had been given security clearance for the internship. An investigation by Le Soir, Knack, La Lettre, and FTM reveals how the young researcher ended up at NATO – and why she eventually appeared on the radar of the security services.

This arms manufacturer was jailed in Brussels. Now Estonia is welcoming his investment

Last year, he was in a Belgian prison cell. Now, he’s set to carry out one of the largest (defence) investments ever in Estonia. The new ammunition factory, built by Turkish arms manufacturer Ismail Terlemez, meant to strengthen Europe against the threat from Russia.

Estonia has chosen his company because it wants to invest as little public money as possible. In doing so, the country appears willing to overlook his controversial past.

How AI is changing Europe’s weapons industry

After NATO announced more than €44 billion in new contracts at its Ankara summit, IrpiMedia investigated the growing defence-tech industry. US firms Palantir and Anduril are competing for a NATO contract, while European companies such as Germany’s Helsing are attracting investors and taking part in EU-funded defence projects. As Europe increases defence spending, public and private money is pouring into companies developing AI and autonomous military technology.

The dark side of the energy drink boom

An international investigation by Paper Trail Media and partners found that Germany’s energy and sports drink market has almost tripled in a decade, reaching more than €6.5 billion. As concerns grow over high consumption among teenagers, reporters traced how the industry has sought to influence the debate over restrictions, from lobbying politicians to funding scientific research. Red Bull has met politicians involved in Germany’s debate over age limits, while company-funded research has also fed into European assessments of energy drink safety.

Get 1 month of unlimited access to independent journalism. Sign up today.

Until next week

We’re also on a mission to break up with American Big Tech. Learn why digital autonomy matters to us.

Got feedback, tips, or story ideas? Get in touch at info@ftm.nl

Podcast | They killed the journalist, but not the story

Emma du Chatinier, Lise Witteman — Thu, 30 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

In this episode: Slovak investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée – archeologist Martina Kušnírová – were murdered in their home in 2018. Kuciak was investigating high-level corruption, including alleged connections to people around Prime Minister Robert Fico. After his death, journalists across Slovakia picked up the work Kuciak had been unable to finish. Their revelations, together with mass protests, even brought down the government.

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Emma and Lise speak with Lukáš Diko, editor-in-chief of the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak, about what the murder meant for Slovakia, and for the journalists who continued to follow Kuciak’s trail. “We never could have imagined that one of us could have been killed because of journalistic work.”

Espionage at NATO: This is the suspect who was arrested last week

Jesse Pinster — Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:00:00 GMT

An intern arrested on suspicions of having spied on NATO is an artificial intelligence researcher who has previously worked for multiple other international organisations and who might have provided China with sensitive information, an investigation by Follow the Money and media partners shows.

Belgian authorities announced on Saturday that they had arrested a Canadian woman, who had been an intern at NATO’s military headquarters – the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) – on suspicions of espionage.

The intern is Claire Z., a Canadian researcher of Chinese origin, an investigation by Follow the Money and media partners Le Soir, Knack, and La Lettre found. Two security officials confirmed her identity.

Z. arrived in the Belgian town of Mons in July 2025 to begin her internship in SHAPE’s IT department. She extended her initial six-month term to a year.

“She held a security clearance issued by Canada”

Just before her internship ended, police raided her student room in Mons and her workplace at NATO on Thursday last week. The next day, Z. was arrested. She is suspected of “espionage on behalf of a third country and participation in a criminal organisation”, the prosecutors said.

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Z., who speaks fluent Chinese and English, specialises in artificial intelligence, the media consortium’s investigation shows. In 2022, she obtained a Master’s degree in computer science from a Canadian university and subsequently wrote several academic papers, the most recent of which examined how artificial intelligence that detects patterns can be better protected against hostile attacks.

Canadian authorities had given approval for her internship. “She held a security clearance issued by Canada,” a security official said, adding that while she could have collected some intelligence helpful for Chinese authorities, access to classified information was only shared on a need-to-know basis.

The Public Safety Canada department did not respond to a request for comment.

She displayed suspicious behaviour that was picked up on

Z. came to the attention of SHAPE’s internal counter-intelligence service, which shared the information with the Belgian General Intelligence and Security Service (ADIV) “because it observed that the young Canadian woman was exhibiting behaviour that went beyond that of a mere intern at NATO”, the official said.

According to another security official, Z. was seen hanging around NATO’s buildings and was frequently asking hypothetical questions about breaches of security protocols.

“She displayed suspicious behaviour that was picked up on,” the first official said, without giving details on the behaviour. “Recently, more attention has been paid to the Chinese threat. Perhaps colleagues asked themselves: what is that Chinese woman doing here?”

Neither security official shared further details on evidence in the ongoing investigation.

Security and Defence

Europe is investing heavily to ramp up its security. FTM takes a close look at how the money is being spent.

A lawyer for Z. declined to comment.

According to the two security officials, interns at SHAPE could gather a significant amount of information that could be of interest to Chinese intelligence services, such as people’s names and identities, internal security procedures, and building plans, as well as routes of guards and locations of CCTV cameras.

SHAPE spokesperson Colonel Martin O’Donnell said that “at this time, there is no indication that NATO or SHAPE operational readiness, command and control arrangements, or ongoing tasks have been adversely affected. SHAPE continues to fulfil its responsibilities without interruption”.

NATO is not the first European or international organisation where Z. has worked. Her social media accounts show that she previously undertook a 10-month internship at the European Space Agency’s (ESA) research centre in Italy. She also worked at the World Trade Organisation in Switzerland and for various Canadian government organisations.

Further investigation will have to determine whether Z. was indeed carrying out intelligence work, and whether this was done on behalf of China. However, according to the first official, this would fit into China’s playbook.

“We know that the Chinese government makes extensive use of its diaspora for espionage and influence operations. At the same time, Beijing can use the fact that she is not Chinese to its advantage,” she said. “Officially, that is correct too; the Chinese do not recognise dual nationality.”

The Chinese Embassy in Brussels said that it was not aware of the facts of the case but that no Chinese nationals seemed to be involved in the affair. “To date, no non-anonymous source or official body has reported any link to China,” a spokesperson said. “We will therefore not respond to a malicious attempt to link the two, or to false information from anonymous sources. In our view, China and Belgium, and China and Europe in general, need dialogue and direct, sincere communication rather than unfounded, fabricated suspicions.”

On Tuesday, Z.’s detention was prolonged to one month, a spokesperson for the federal prosecutors’ office said.

This article was updated on 28.07.2026 at 20:53 to correct who prolonged Z.’s detention

Why a French carmaker saw greener cars as a ‘risk’

Peter Teffer, Simon Van Dorpe, Alexander Fanta, Salsabil Fayed — Mon, 27 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Welcome back to the last edition of Bureau Brussels before we take a short summer break. We'll return at the end of August, when the EU bubble starts filling up again. By then, the temperature should have dropped, but the stories will only just be heating up.

What’s in store this week?

French carmaker sees making greener cars as risky
Former EU auditor avoids trial over misuse of funds
The EU’s diplomatic service misses the memo about itself

STORY OF THE WEEK

Why a French carmaker saw greener cars as a ‘risk’

Earlier this month, major carmakers won an important legal battle in the UK over alleged emissions cheating. The case involved some of the same manufacturers at the centre of the 2015 Dieselgate scandal.

Roughly 1.6 million car owners had sued more than a dozen manufacturers. They accused them of fitting diesel vehicles with prohibited defeat devices: software that tricks official emissions tests into making cars appear cleaner than they actually are.

London’s High Court found that in the majority of the 20 sample vehicles examined, there was no illegal defeat device present.

But the case is far from over. Another trial is due in October 2026 to decide damages and other remedies where breaches were identified.

The proceedings allowed us rare access to internal corporate documents. They offer an unusually candid glimpse into how leading carmakers view authorities. We discussed some of the most striking examples in a recent podcast.

We’ve now received another document. It’s a 2010 note written by engineers working at PSA Peugeot Citroën – now part of Stellantis, which declined to comment. It suggested that making cleaner cars was never the real goal.

In the document, the authors wrote that one of their emissions-filtering technologies gave PSA “a competitive advantage”, allowing it to stay ahead of future regulatory requirements.

But they also issued a warning: getting too far ahead would pose a “major” risk, they wrote.

Why? Because it could prove “too early” that cleaner cars were technically possible beyond what EU rules required. That, they warned, could give the European Commission “the opportunity to tighten” emissions standards even further.

In other words, proving that cleaner cars were possible could lead to stricter pollution rules. Such an argument weakens the wider industry’s long-standing lobbying claims: that tougher environmental requirements are unrealistic and too difficult to achieve.

Court documents also formed the basis for another article we published. We revealed how German authorities concluded in 2023 that Nissan diesel cars contained illegal emissions software. That case exposed another concerning problem. EU countries still leave each other in the dark when it comes to sharing information about suspected cheating instances. This information gap was a major problem pre-Dieselgate, which the Commission hoped to solve with new rules.

Our recent request for documents suggests little has changed. Member states were legally required to tell the Commission by 1 September 2025 how they had applied the new rules. None met the deadline.

Since then, only four of the EU’s 27 countries have responded. That delay has now pushed back the Commission’s own review. It had been due by 1 September this year, but is now expected “at the end of 2026 or early 2027”, according to a Commission spokesperson.

Peter Teffer

Other news from the EU bubble

Former Belgian minister and EU auditor will not face trial over misuse of EU money

Karel Pinxten, Belgium’s former defence and agriculture minister and former member of the European Court of Auditors (ECA), will not face criminal charges over his misuse of ECA resources, we’ve learned from Luxembourg prosecutors.

Prosecutors closed the case in May as they found that Pinxten had already been sufficiently punished by administrative rulings by the EU courts, they told us last week.

In 2021, the EU’s highest court found him “guilty of very serious infringements”, including charging skiing and hunting trips to the ECA, using its fuel card for others, and remaining active in Belgian politics while serving as an auditor.

It stripped him of two-thirds of his EU pension. In 2024, the EU lower court ruled that the ECA could rightfully recover most of over 150,000 in expenses for which Pinxten had unlawfully claimed reimbursement.

The contrast is striking. The ECA referred Pinxten to the EU’s anti-fraud office in 2016 and lifted his immunity in 2018. But in a more recent criminal investigation into former ECA president Klaus-Heiner Lehne, it has repeatedly blocked investigators.

Simon Van Dorpe

Everyone got the memo. Except the EU’s diplomatic service.

Germany, France, and other EU countries are reportedly considering plans to dismantle the European External Action Service (EEAS) and fold it back into the Commission. According to the Financial Times, a French proposal for a radical overhaul of the EEAS is circulating across European capitals.

But when we requested the document under the EU’s freedom of information law, the EEAS said neither it nor High Representative Kaja Kallas’s cabinet possessed it.

The EEAS also refused to release a June email in which Kallas reportedly advocated for a “strong EEAS”. She argued that disclosure could be “misinterpreted” by non-EU nations and could “discourage their day-to-day cooperation with the EEAS”. Let’s hope those countries don’t read the Financial Times …

Alexander Fanta

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A year of reporting EU tax disclosures, and the picture gets clearer

As the Union approaches the first anniversary of mandatory public country-by-country tax reporting, transparency advocates are taking stock of what data has been collected. The Fair Tax Foundation says the disclosures expose tax avoidance by multinationals. The reporting provides a vital behind-the-scenes look at aggressive profit shifting. Take, for example, Microsoft’s Irish hub. According to its own accounts, it generated €7 million in pre-tax profit per employee. That’s 13 times the tech giant’s worldwide average.

These disclosure requirements are a starting point for uncovering how tech giants structure their operations to minimise their tax bills.

Salsabil Fayed

Our latest investigations

From police headquarters to wind farms: China’s hidden investments in infrastructure and real estate across Europe

As the World Cup nears its finale, FIFA is already in hot water. Could it be heading for a red card? After controversy over its ties to Donald Trump, FIFA risks prosecution for sending $1.2 million to Russian clubs linked to sanctioned figures. With another round of payments approaching, will FIFA risk repeating the same foul?

Shell shifted billions in profits to tax havens, leaked files reveal

How did Shell make $6.2 billion over a five-year period through an office with just 37 employees? Leaked financial reports and research from research group SOMO reveal how the company shifted profits through the Bahamas and other tax havens. An expert said one of its Dutch tax practices may have been illegal.

Shell says it followed the rules. But the findings shine a light on a global tax system that lets profits move across borders far more easily than tax bills.

Read the full investigation

A refined strategy: how Europe’s industry lobby managed to block sugar taxes

Charging more for sugar-rich foods to encourage healthier eating sounds like a simple idea. But as soon as governments introduce a sugar tax, Big Food fights back – hiring lawyers, lobbyists, and conjuring up doomsday economic scenarios. And often, it works.

Across Europe, several sugar taxes have been watered down, postponed, or scrapped entirely. Now, as the Netherlands makes a new attempt, it remains to be seen whether the sugar lobby will get its way again.

This arms manufacturer was jailed in Brussels. Now Estonia is welcoming his investment

Jesse Pinster — Mon, 27 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What’s the news?

Estonia has signed a deal with the Turkish company Arca Defense to build an ammunition factory. The promised investment of €300 million is one of the largest foreign investments ever in the Baltic country.
But Arca’s boss is controversial. A year ago, Ismail Terlemez was imprisoned for two months in Belgium in connection to a corruption case.

Why does it matter?

In Europe, defence investments are being ramped up in response to the war in Ukraine. This expansion creates lucrative business opportunities – even for those with checkered pasts.

How was this investigated?

Follow the Money traveled to Estonia to speak with high-ranking officials, the minister of foreign affairs, and visited the site where the factory will be built. We have also been following the activities of Terlemez for the past year.

This article is part of an ongoing series.

Security and Defence

Northern Estonia is as flat as a pancake, until you approach the town of Kiviõli. Out of nowhere, two hills loom up. They are so high that one even has a ski lift going to the top.

These are not natural mountains, but the result of mining in the region. The company Kiviõli Keemiatööstus (Kiviõli Chemical Industry) has been extracting brown shale oil here for decades.

Now, as Europe shifts to clean energy – and the threat from Russia, just sixty kilometres away, becomes ever more acute – the region is looking for ways to diversify away from the industry that has literally shaped its landscape.

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A Turkish arms manufacturer wants to build a €300 million ammunition factory here – one of the largest foreign investments in Estonia’s history – and promises it will create a thousand jobs.

But Ismail Terlemez, the founder of the Turkish defence company Arca Defense and the man behind the Estonia project, was in a Belgian prison just a year ago over accusations of corruption while he was working at NATO.

The ammunition factory is slated be built in this landscape.

Why does Arca Defense want to build a factory in this small Baltic Nation? And why does this EU and NATO member state want to do business with Terlemez despite his tarnished reputation, when less controversial European defence companies are both able and willing to build munitions factories?

Follow the Money travelled to Estonia to speak to those directly involved and visit the site where – from 2028, if the invasion is still ongoing – munition could be produced for Ukrainian troops fighting against Russia.

Black snow

Locals say that Kiviõli’s pivot away from oil – which will not see the mine completely shutter, but rather give up a large tranche of land for the production of munitions – is borne not only out of geopolitical and defence ambitions but also economic necessity.

Dmitri Dmitrijev, the mayor of the town, highlighted that the price of brown shale oil can be very low, meaning that continued “dependence” on this one industry creates a risk. “We have 500 or even more jobs at the factory there [out of a population of some 4,500], so if something were to happen one day forcing them to shut down production, it would be quite a big problem for the small local authorities.”

In the first quarter of 2026, the price of a tonne of shale oil plummeted to €352, 17% less than a year earlier. Competition from renewables and rising prices of carbon emissions are the main factors in this decline.

We know everything about Russia, we are very close

Brown shale oil – which, less than twenty years ago, accounted for 90% of Estonia’s electricity production – is slowly but surely being replaced by cleaner energy.

By 2024, only a third of electricity was still generated from brown shale oil, with renewable sources accounting for half of the electricity supply. And as a result, space is being freed up in Kiviõli for other economic activities that are on the rise, such as the arms industry.

Dmitrijev, a 44-year-old Kiviõli native who remembers seeing black snow as a boy caused by factory ash, defended the idea of a new use for the site.

“The plot of land where the factory is to be built has already been used for mining. It’s not as though nature has to make way for the factory. It’s actually a sort of lunar landscape,” he laughed.

European defence companies pull out

Since the start of the war in 2022, the Ukrainian army has been firing around 15,000 artillery shells a day. European allies are working to ensure that Ukraine receives enough ammunition to keep up its defence.

But stocks are dwindling, so new production is needed. Nowhere in the EU is this urgency felt more keenly than in the Baltic states, where people are acutely aware of the threat from neighbouring Russia.

“We know everything about Russia, we are very close,” said Margus Tsahkna, Estonia’s minister for foreign affairs, in an interview with Follow the Money.

Tsahkna wants to make it clear that Estonia is prepared for anything, including an invasion of its own territory: “We will bring the war to Russia,” said the minister.

Security and Defence

Europe is investing heavily to ramp up its security. FTM takes a close look at how the money is being spent.

The production of ammunition in all the Baltic states is part of that plan. At the end of 2024, Lithuania announced the construction of an ammunition factory. Latvia did the same in September 2025.

Both of those factories are being built by the German defence giant Rheinmetall.

The announcement that a factory would also be built in Estonia followed in April 2026. But there is a major difference compared with the other two Baltic countries. Rheinmetall has insisted that the governments in Lithuania and Latvia become part-owners of the factory and thus also assume a significant share of the investment and the risk. The Estonian government refused to do the same.

“We are of the opinion that the private defence industry is much more agile when it comes to building industrial capacities and operating them,” said Indrek Sirp, special adviser on defence industry development at the Estonian ministry of defence.

“We don’t want to spend our taxpayers’ money on building all those factories, which we’d have to do if it were Rheinmetall, for instance,” he added. “We think that at the moment there’s enough potential in the defence industry to fund most of those projects on their own.”

Rheinmetall, as well as the British defence firm BAE Systems, did initially show interest. But without sales being guaranteed or any willingness on the part of the government to enter into a joint venture, that interest dissipated. Neither company ultimately submitted a bid for the public tender.

In fact, there was only one party that did so: Arca Defence from Turkey.

Belgian prison

The entrepreneur Ismail Terlemez, born in Turkey in 1982, worked until 2020 for NATO. At the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), he was responsible for the technical specifications relating to the procurement, destruction and recycling of ammunition.

In July 2020, Terlemez resigned from the NSPA. Back in Turkey, he founded the defence company Arca Defence and began manufacturing ammunition. The company has been growing explosively ever since. It is Turkey’s largest ammunition exporter (with sales of $2.9 billion in 2025) and is the 12th largest company in the country.

This is a remarkable rise for a business that did not even exist six years ago.

But Terlemez also has a checkered past.

“As our agencies conduct their background checks, they will look more closely into those claims”

When Terlemez’s private jet landed at Brussels Zaventem Airport on 13 May 2025, he was arrested.

During his time at NATO, he is alleged to have accepted bribes from a former NSPA colleague who had gone on to work as a consultant for defence companies, in exchange for rigging tenders.

According to a US indictment, Terlemez is alleged to have received €115,000 for manipulating the purchase of explosives (TNT) by the US Army .

In addition, as previously reported by Follow the Money, he maintained close contacts with a Belgian defence consultant who is the main suspect in a Belgian investigation into corruption surrounding NATO tenders.

The judicial investigation was being conducted by the US authorities, who requested Terlemez’s extradition. Pending this, the Turkish businessman was held in a Belgian prison cell.

But at the last minute, the extradition was called off.

Signing ceremony during the SAHA International Defence and Aerospace Exhibition 2026, a major arms fair in Istanbul. In the centre of the panel is Estonian Minister of Defence Hanno Pevkur; to his right is his Turkish counterpart Yaşar Güler. On the far left is Ismail Terlemez.

For reasons that are unclear – but which former US justice department officials earlier told Follow the Money could have been because of political interference – the US government withdrew the request.

After just under two months in prison, Terlemez was released. His private jet was waiting at the airport where he had previously been arrested, ready to fly him directly to Turkey.

The allegations against Terlemez and his sudden release appear to have had little impact on his company, Arca.

Even while Terlemez was detained in Belgium, Arca acquired the Italian defence firm Esplodenti Sabino. The company also recently secured multi-billion-dollar deals with the Bulgarian firm VTIC ($2.2 billion) and the American firm Global Military Products ($1.2 billion).

And so Arca is set to build a factory in Estonia, where confidence in the Turkish company and its owner appears to remain unshaken.

“What he has done in the defence industry, I think, is quite significant,” said Sirp, the ministry of defence special advisor. “I have no doubts about his capabilities to run that sort of business.”

Arca Defense did not respond to questions from Follow the Money. BAE Systems also failed to respond. A Rheinmetall spokesperson said: “[A]s a matter of principle, we do not comment on ongoing business matters.”

All investments are welcome

A 141-hectare site – the equivalent roughly 200 football pitches – where brown shale oil was once extracted has been designated as the location of the factory.

The Estonian government has pledged to invest €10 million in infrastructure. Arca’s assertion that the project will create 1,000 new jobs may be optimistic, given that Rheinmetall’s comparable factories in Lithuania and Latvia will – according to the German defence company – create only 150 to 200 jobs.

Foreign Minister Tshanka revealed little else about the deal to Follow the Money. He said: “It has been a strategic decision that we need to bring this ammunition factory and production to our territories.”

Marko Mihkelson, chair of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, added: “Every investment in [the defence industry], whether from Estonia or abroad, which strengthens our resolve, readiness and deterrence, ultimately helps our economy as well. It is welcome.”

Estonia spends big on defence

Estonia is unwilling to foot the bill for the munitions factory, but that does not mean the country spends little on defence. Within NATO, there is only one country that spends relatively more (as a proportion of gross domestic product): Lithuania.

According to recent NATO data, Estonia will spend 5.1 per cent of its GDP on defence in 2026. Much of that money will go towards the purchase of weapons systems, such as the HIMARS mobile rocket artillery system, and associated ammunition. By way of comparison, the Netherlands spends 2.6 per cent of its GDP on defence.

For Arca, too, a factory on EU soil could prove highly lucrative. This is because it would potentially benefit from the €150 billion in loans that the EU is making available for defence investments.

But the Turkish company’s investment – which appears to have already been finalised with celebratory press photos at the SAHA International Defence and Aerospace Exhibition in Istanbul – is in fact not yet complete.

A background check still needs to be carried out.

Defence ministry advisor Sirp said: “There is this presumption of innocence. (...) but obviously we were aware of those reports and I’m sure that as our agencies conduct their background checks, they will look more closely into those claims.”

The more diverse our economic sectors are, the better

Arca will have to apply for an ammunition operating licence. Sirp expects this application to be submitted at any moment, and the Estonian security services will then launch a due diligence investigation that could take several months.

Until then, construction of the munitions factory – intended to strengthen Europe against the threat from Russia – will not begin in the mining region of Estonia. Even for the mayor of Kiviõli, it is unclear how long this will take, though he hopes the factory will be built soon. “The more diverse our economic sectors are, the better, as it means we’re not dependent on a single sector.”

Dmitrijev said he was not particularly concerned about who would end up building the factory. “Sometimes you just realise that the process is not entirely under your control (...) The final decision regarding the construction of the plant must be made at government level.”

Leaks, loopholes & lobbyists

Eve Moore — Sat, 25 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Dear readers,

This week, our reporting exposes China's secret real estate investments across Europe and how Shell shifted billions through tax havens. We also examine how Big Food companies have repeatedly derailed sugar taxes across the bloc. Elsewhere, our partners uncover the Russian links to a password manager used by European governments and universities, and why the EU’s “polluter pays” principle often leaves affected communities to bear the costs.

Here’s your weekly investigative briefing.

From us:

From police headquarters to wind farms: China’s hidden investments in infrastructure and real estate across Europe

What do Scottish wind farms have in common with Amsterdam’s Red Light District? They’re both partially owned by China.

After the financial crisis, China’s central bank quietly injected capital into European infrastructure and real estate – from Amazon warehouses in Poland to a high-speed internet company in France. Together with our media partners, we discovered how the state managed to do this without anyone knowing.

Read the investigation

Shell shifted billions in profits to tax havens, leaked files reveal

Shell says it followed the rules. But the findings shine a light on a global tax system that lets profits move across borders far more easily than tax bills.

Read the full investigation

A refined strategy: how Europe’s industry lobby managed to block sugar taxes

Podcast | The man who sold Brussels the hydrogen dream

Europe set sky-high targets for green hydrogen. Today, it’s nowhere near meeting them. Journalist Jesse Pinster traced Brussels’ big hydrogen bet back to one professor: Ad van Wijk. How did his vision become that of Europe?

From friends of FTM:

European password manager’s Russian ties raise security questions

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How EU pollution rules leave victims paying the price

A cross-border investigation by Voxeurop and others found that the EU’s “polluter pays” principle – introduced in 1972 to make companies bear the cost of environmental damage – often falls short. Through cases in Italy, Belgium, and France, reporters found that companies may be forced to clean up contaminated sites. But residents are often left with health costs, polluted land, and falling property values. When companies fail to pay, public authorities can end up covering the clean-up costs with taxpayers’ money.

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Video of the week:

Spain has dominated headlines recently, from its FIFA World Cup victory to Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez standing firm against Donald Trump. Politically, the country has earned a reputation as one of Europe’s most progressive voices. But how do Spaniards actually see their country’s political direction? In a recent FTM podcast, political analyst and activist Elsa Arnaiz Chico shared her perspective.

🔗 Listen to the full episode of the podcast here

Until next week

Next week, we’re launching the first episode of our Podcast Summer Series, exploring standout investigations with fellow investigative newsrooms. Follow the podcast so you don’t miss the first episode when it lands next Wednesday.

We’re also on a mission to break up with American Big Tech. Learn why digital autonomy matters to us.

Got feedback, tips, or story ideas? Get in touch at info@ftm.nl

From police headquarters to wind farms: China’s hidden investments in infrastructure and real estate across Europe

Ingrid Gercama, Tom Stocks, Antonio Baquero, Nick de Jager — Fri, 24 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What’s the news?

China’s Central Bank has invested in European critical infrastructure.
This includes a building used by the European Commission, a Belgian police headquarter, wind farms in Scotland, and a high-speed internet company in France, amongst others.
Reporters found that by routing investments through a web of Luxembourg shell companies and offshore jurisdictions, Beijing’s European footprint remains largely invisible to the general public.

Why does it matter?

Experts warned of increasing opacity around company ownership in Europe which effectively prevents the public from knowing who controls critical infrastructure.
This lack of transparency carries a potential security risk, an expert warned.

How was this investigated?

Reporters pieced together fragmented European corporate registries, mapping out the European assets held by the investment arm of China’s central bank.

This article is part of an ongoing series.

The China Files

From a gas company in Spain and a building used by the European Commission to a police headquarters in Belgium: China’s central bank has been scooping up stakes in companies and properties across Europe, a new international investigation can reveal.

By trawling through data from European business and land ownership registries, reporters were able to uncover the complex web of offshore Caribbean companies and Luxembourg holding firms through which this state agency holds its assets – and which help keep its ownership out of the public view.

While investors of any origin routinely use offshore vehicles and complex corporate structures for tax efficiency, the findings give a rare insight into how China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the authority that manages the country’s foreign exchange reserves, makes investments in Europe.

According to experts who focus on China’s foreign investments and trade, the agency is known for shrouding its investments and decision-making processes in secrecy.

“SAFE recently has gone to significant lengths to mask the size of its investments, so it clearly is keen to stay out of the limelight,” said Brad Setser, a fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations focused on China and ex-deputy assistant secretary of the US Treasury.

“It is perfectly clear that ambiguous or hidden ownership structures, especially in strategic economic or infrastructure sectors, can pose a massive risk”

Together with media partner OCCRP and other media outlets, FTM traced 28 companies in Luxembourg. The firms have been used by SAFE over the past 14 years to buy equity stakes in an eclectic range of European assets including a fiber-optic cable company in France, wind farms in the UK, and the building housing a luxury hotel in the Netherlands. Most of the Luxembourg firms have never been publicly linked to SAFE until now.

“Luxembourg is really the financial hub for China in Europe,” said China expert Frans-Paul Van der Putten. “As far as I know, Chinese banks all have their EU headquarters in Luxembourg.”

Most of the investments China made in the data collected took place between 2011 and 2015.

“These were the years following the financial crisis, when Europe was in need of capital,” said China expert Van der Putten. “China had that capital to offer. For many Chinese banks and funds, it was an opportune time to go bargain hunting.”

But that’s not without risks.

The European Parliament and European intelligence agencies have previously expressed concern over the risks of economic dependence, espionage, and sabotage connected to China’s economic presence in critical infrastructure and strategic sectors across the EU.

“There is a more generalised tendency towards opacity”

“It is perfectly clear that ambiguous or hidden ownership structures, especially in strategic economic or infrastructure sectors, can pose a massive risk,” said Engin Eroğlu, a German EU lawmaker hailing from the centrist Freie Wähler. “We already know from the US that Chinese companies, some of which are state-owned, specifically buy land adjacent to military facilities… A similar problem could therefore arise in Europe if we do not gain a clear overview of this non-transparent approach.”

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Yet Mario Esteban, a professor in East Asian studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, cautioned that such concerns should be weighed against Europe’s economic need for Chinese investment.

“There’s a fine line between avoiding overdependence and ending up demonising all investment that comes from China,” he said. “I think we need a narrative with a little more caution, and an understanding that some of these investments can genuinely generate added value for our country.”

He warned though of an increasing tilt towards a lack of transparency in company ownership – by China and other major investors.

“It’s not exclusive to China,” he said. “There is a more generalised tendency towards opacity.”

In the case of SAFE, the ultimate ownership of its BVI-based nominees is not made public through the islands’ business registry, and the link could only be drawn by tracking down references to the companies in annual reports and listings in Luxembourg and the UK.

The China Files

What does China’s advance on the international stage mean for Europe?

Though the BVI has recently rolled out a new register of “ultimate beneficial owners”, companies that are majority owned by foreign governments are not required to file this data. When reporters requested ownership information for the SAFE nominees through its website, they were given an error message, and the BVI’s registry did not respond to an additional request sent by email.

But unpicking SAFE’s holdings was difficult inside Europe too, and required painstakingly piecing together what was available in public records.

A ruling in 2022 by the EU’s Court of Justice rolled back a legal requirement to make beneficial ownership registers in the EU accessible to the public. This has has made documenting these structures even more difficult, said Alex Cobham, the chief executive of the Tax Justice Network.

“We should be afraid of anonymity,” he said. “It is better for all of us to know who owns real estate or critical infrastructure.”

Shell shifted billions in profits to tax havens, leaked files reveal

Henk Willem Smits — Thu, 23 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What’s the news?

Oil and gas major Shell used questionable financial strategies in the Netherlands to avoid paying corporate tax, according to research by SOMO – an NGO focused on corporate accountability. A tax law professor from Leiden University said he considered one of the company’s tactics to be illegal.
This could amount to unlawful state aid if the Dutch government is aware of Shell’s practices and is allowing it to avoid taxes, according to the academic.
Globally, Shell has shifted profits to the Bahamas and Switzerland, which are tax havens. As a result, the treasuries of countries including Brazil, Nigeria, and the UK have potentially lost out on hundreds of millions of euros in tax revenue, the research found.

Why does it matter?

Tax avoidance and evasion by multinationals through global transfer pricing guidelines is under growing scrutiny. SOMO said the system is “as leaky as a sieve”, resulting in significant amounts in missed taxes worldwide.
The European Commission is trying to tackle illegal state aid. Brussels won a legal battle against Apple in 2014 over a €13 billion tax bill in Ireland.

How was this investigated?

SOMO and a Leiden University professor studied financial reports that Shell shares with tax authorities. The documents were leaked after a major hack.
FTM interviewed the research group and the academic, and studied the files.

Facing growing pressure over its tax affairs in the Netherlands years ago, oil and gas giant Shell made an eyebrow-raising admission.

The company had never paid corporate tax in the country, it admitted in 2019.

Shell Netherlands’ then-President and CEO Marjan van Loon said this was not an oversight, but a legitimate practice because the corporation offset its Dutch profits against costs and losses incurred elsewhere in the world.

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As a result, Shell made a loss in the Netherlands, reducing its Dutch corporate tax bill to zero, van Loon explained at the time.

But a tranche of leaked Shell financial reports have cast doubt on the credibility of that claim – and raised questions about the legality of the company’s wider tax arrangements, a tax law professor and corporate accountability researchers told Follow the Money.

Shell was among the companies hit by a major hack of global cloud provider Accellion in December 2020.

More than 200,000 of its documents – from confidential transfer pricing reports to ledgers containing millions of transactions – were shared on the dark web, according to SOMO, a Dutch research group focused on multinationals.

SOMO worked with Jan van de Streek, a professor of tax law at Leiden University, to analyse four reports regarding the transfer pricing of oil supplies, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and royalty payments between Shell subsidiaries in different countries.

The documents are so difficult to decipher that even specialists and officials would struggle to make sense of Shell’s tactics in the Netherlands, and to determine whether they constitute legal tax avoidance or illegal tax evasion, the academic said.

“That seems to have been done on purpose: making it so vague that no one understands it,” Van de Streek told FTM.

“We had to do one year of research just to understand one report properly. For an employee of the [Netherlands] revenue authority, this will also be very difficult to comprehend,” he added.

Two of Shell’s strategies examined by SOMO based on the leaked documents – which involved a subsidiary in Switzerland and a trading office in the Bahamas – were considered by the NGO and Van de Streek to be within the boundaries of global tax laws.

However, the way that Shell’s subsidiaries in various nations share the costs for things such as IT, human resources, and maintenance services are “unbusinesslike” and “illegal” in the Netherlands, said Van de Streek.

The amount of missed taxes is astronomical

The impact of Shell’s tax practices on state coffers in the Netherlands and beyond is significant – with treasuries in several nations potentially missing out on sums worth hundreds of millions of euros respectively in recent years, SOMO’s estimates show.

In response to the findings, Shell said it “does not use ‘tax havens’ in order to avoid taxes on activities which take place elsewhere”.

“Since 2018, we have published an annual Tax Contribution Report. In this report, we publish information on our revenues, results, and taxes paid, as well as the principles we follow and the positions we advocate,” a spokesperson said.

“We will not provide further details regarding our tax filings, as these are confidential and commercially sensitive. We categorically reject any suggestion of involvement in illegal practices.”

‘Full of holes’

Although Shell moved its headquarters and tax base from The Hague to London in 2021 and dropped “Royal Dutch” from its name, the Netherlands still has a key role.

It is home to Shell’s upstream business, which is responsible for exploration and extraction of oil and gas. The Dutch branch delivers technical and administrative support to other parts of the company for such operations, among other things.

Meanwhile, the company’s British base focuses on its downstream business – refining and selling fuels and producing petrochemicals used in plastics.

So while Shell’s most important business units are in the UK and the Netherlands, the company has recorded very high profits in the Bahamas and Switzerland in recent years – which are both tax havens – according to SOMO’s research.

The reason lies in transfer pricing, meaning the prices set when a multinational’s subsidiaries in different countries buy and sell goods or services from one another.

The NGO Tax Justice Network estimated in 2019 that such transactions make up more than a third of all global trade, worth about $7 trillion to $9 trillion each year.

Under 1995 transfer pricing guidelines established by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), different branches of a multinational must sell goods and services to each other at market prices – including a fair profit margin.

Multinationals can use creative accounting and interpretations to bend and exploit the rules

Through this so-called “arm’s length principle”, profits should be recorded where they are generated.

For example, if Shell wants to refine oil from Nigeria in Rotterdam, its Dutch entity should pay its Nigerian subsidiary a market-based price – similar to what another oil company or wholesaler would charge.

This would ensure that Shell’s Nigerian operations earn a legitimate profit, which Nigeria’s government could then tax.

The same should apply in reverse when Shell Nigeria wishes to use Shell Netherlands’ technical, administrative or IT services. The latter should receive a market-based rate, and make profits that could be taxed by the Dutch government.

While the principle seems simple on paper, in practice it is extremely complicated.

There are many exceptions, and profit margins vary depending on factors like the level of entrepreneurial risk taken by a subsidiary. Determining a market price for intangible assets such as patents, logos, or trademarks is far from straightforward.

This complexity means multinationals can use creative accounting and interpretations to bend and exploit the rules, allowing them to shift profits to jurisdictions with the lowest taxes instead of where the work is carried out.

“The Shell Files show that the [transfer pricing] system is full of holes,” said Vincent Kiezebrink, a senior researcher at SOMO.

“The repercussions go far beyond Shell. Most of the world’s multinationals and tax authorities use OECD transfer pricing rules, and the amount of missed taxes is astronomical,” he added.

From the Bahamas to Brazil and beyond

Shell’s entity in the Bahamas is a prime example of how the multinational takes advantage of loopholes in the global tax system, according to SOMO’s research.

This subsidiary, Shell Western Supply and Trading Limited (SWST), buys oil from Shell fields in West Africa and Latin America. It then sells the oil to other Shell entities – notably the UK and Singapore.

As a result, the Bahamas trading office – which has just 37 employees – posted profits of $6.2 billion between 2018 and 2023, according to SOMO’s analysis of Shell’s annual tax contribution reports. None of that was taxed.

That means each SWST staff member generated $28 million per year for the company in that period. By comparison, Shell’s employees worldwide produced an average of $270,000 in annual profits, according to SOMO’s calculations.

Average profit per employee in the Bahamas was therefore more than 104 times the average across the Shell group. According to SOMO, the contrast between the Bahamas office and a similar Shell trading office in the UK points to tax avoidance. In that UK office, profit per employee was only three times the group average.

Ultimately, up to $5.6 billion in profit from Shell subsidiaries in higher-tax jurisdictions may have been shifted to SWST, according to the research.

The Bahamas trading office has benefited from arbitrage – taking advantage of price differences across markets – as well as by buying up surplus oil, SOMO found.

This strategy likely came at the expense of Nigeria and Brazil, where Shell pumps oil, and the UK, where the company processes oil, according to the report.

The Bahamas did not levy corporate income tax on any companies prior to 2024. In the UK, the main corporation tax rate is 25%, in Nigeria it is up to 50%, and Brazil stands at 34%.

Shell’s strategy of shifting profits to the Bahamas resulted in the loss of potential tax revenue in Brazil, Nigeria, and the UK, according to SOMO.

The NGO estimates that those three countries collectively missed out on between $1.2 billion and $2.8 billion over the 2018-2023 period as a result.

This type of tax avoidance is legal in principle, according to Van de Streek.

“Multinationals are free to choose tax havens for their activities,” he said.

However, there are question marks over what Shell’s Bahamas entity claims to do – especially with just 37 employees – and how that corresponds to its finances.

Under the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines, a company charging the prices and generating the profits that SWST does would be expected to be in control of the economic risks involving huge trading volumes, oil quality, transportation, storage and negotiations with customers.

“Shell’s structure appears to empower its traders [in the Bahamas] to set up transactions to benefit their profit margin, at the expense of its oil production and refining businesses,” SOMO said in its report.

Kiezebrink of SOMO said it was “virtually impossible that the 37 employees could have generated such enormous profits had they been trading in an open market with unrelated trading partners”.

In response to FTM’s questions, Shell defended its trading office in the Bahamas and employees there.

“These are highly skilled people that have the right expertise to manage the trading risks and functions related to the trading of commodities,” its spokesperson said.

SWST has been “labelled under the OECD guidelines as a ‘risk-taking entrepreneur’ and is remunerated accordingly. This has been transparently discussed with relevant tax authorities,” the spokesperson added.

‘Junk science’ behind Swiss royalties

Although it has nothing to do with the production, processing or sale of oil and gas, one of Shell’s subsidiaries in Switzerland also drew scrutiny from SOMO.

Shell Brands International (SBI) manages the multinational’s intellectual property, which includes two patents and some 6,000 brand names and logos, such as the iconic yellow and red shell.

Shell’s downstream divisions elsewhere in the world – excluding the US, Turkey, and South Africa – must pay royalties to SBI for the use of the intellectual property.

Those profits are therefore registered in the Swiss canton of Zug, which offers some of the lowest tax rates in the country.

Between 2018 and 2022, Shell paid an average of 10% in corporate income tax on profits attributed to Switzerland, SOMO found.

This shifts profits away from the treasuries of various countries where Shell’s service stations are located, and where the intellectual property was originally developed.

Van de Streek said Shell’s arrangement involving the SBI and shifting profits to Switzerland was “aggressive” tax avoidance, but pointed out that it is still legal.

The problem, according to SOMO, is that SBI sets royalties arbitrarily and at inflated levels, using “junk science” to justify charging as much as 15% of many filling stations’ pre-tax profits.

Put simply: for every euro that a Shell petrol station (apart from those in the US, Turkey and South Africa) earns in gross profit, 15 cents ends up in Switzerland.

If this royalty income was taxed at the same 10% effective rate Shell has paid in Switzerland – rather than the rates above 20% it faces in many other jurisdictions – the resulting savings from this avoidance structure would amount to at least hundreds of millions, according to the research.

Shell said its tax positions in relation to its trademark in Switzerland, its trading activities in the Bahamas, and its service costs allocation system “are in line with the OECD transfer pricing guidelines”.

“Our positions have been transparently discussed with the relevant tax authorities in the countries in which we operate,” its spokesperson said.

Difficult questions for the Dutch taxman

The Netherlands is where Shell’s tax practices cross the line into illegality, according to Van de Streek.

He said the costs charged by Shell’s entities in the Netherlands to subsidiaries elsewhere in the world do not comply with the OECD’s transfer pricing regulations, which are enshrined in Dutch law.

Shell has several Dutch entities, including SGSI (Shell Global Solutions International) with nearly 2,100 employees, SIEP (Shell International Exploration and Production) with some 650 staff, and SITI (Shell Information Technology International) with more than 520 workers.

These companies are the ones that provide a range of services to Shell’s subsidiaries around the world.

“Shell has fallen below the bare minimum of what can still be considered proper business conduct”

For example, if Shell Mexico has to fix a broken drilling rig, engineers from SGSI do the repairs. The Netherlands-based SGSI charges Shell Mexico for the repair without any mark-up – only the costs are passed on.

The three Dutch entities charged only the costs they incurred for their services – such as office rent, salaries, equipment and computers – rather than applying a market-based profit margin as set out under OECD guidelines, SOMO found.

“It’s so obvious that this is unacceptable; here, Shell has fallen below the bare minimum of what can still be considered proper business conduct,” Van de Streek said.

SOMO estimates that Shell may have avoided more than €1.1 billion in corporate tax in the Netherlands in this manner between 2002 and 2017.

In the case of SIEP, this changed in 2018 following discussions with the Dutch tax authorities, according to the company’s annual report. Since then, it started charging a profit margin for its services, according to the tax professor.

“This confirms my conclusion that the cost price is not a business price,” he added.

Shell said that prior to 2019, cost-based contributions without mark-ups were considered a “valid and legitimate pricing method” based on the OECD’s guidelines.

Since 2019, the company has “agreed with certain tax authorities to apply a taxable ‘deemed’ mark-up on services” in line with updated guidance from the OECD, it said.

“Shell cannot charge these mark-ups in certain jurisdictions due to legal or joint venture constraints, which can result in double taxation. Our cost allocation system (and methodology) is reviewed and approved by our external auditor,” it said.

Van de Streek questioned why the Dutch taxman took so long to probe Shell’s global cost-sharing model, and whether the profit margin charged by SIEP for some of its services is really sufficient.

“Shouldn’t part of Shell's global profits be taxed in the Netherlands? And will the Dutch tax authorities still allow Shell to provide some of the services at cost?” he added.

When asked by FTM, the Dutch tax authority said its “legal duty of fiscal confidentiality” meant it could not respond to individual cases, nor to questions about a specific group of companies such as, for example, “large oil and gas companies”.

A spokesperson said the authority takes action when it “sees a risk in the transfer pricing policy used by the company and/or doubts the correctness of this policy”.

In response to a question about whether there was a focus on significant profits flowing to tax havens such as the Bahamas and Switzerland, the spokesperson said: “High profitability in a low-tax country with few employees can be a signal to the tax authorities, particularly in relation to the nature of the activities.”

Scrutiny over possible state aid

Van de Streek said he hoped his research with SOMO could spur tax authorities globally to conduct a joint investigation into Shell’s practice of shifting profits to the Bahamas via commodity transactions, and Switzerland via royalties.

“The report paints a disconcerting picture of the transfer pricing practices of one of the largest multinationals in the world,” he said.

“Despite the global measures taken against tax avoidance, Shell still appears to be using non-compliant and even unbusinesslike transfer pricing.”

Van de Streek also said that the Dutch government is likely aware of Shell’s questionable tax practices in the Netherlands.

If the Dutch taxman is allowing Shell to pay less corporate tax than it should, that could constitute unlawful state aid, he said.

Shell did not respond to FTM’s question on this issue.

The European Commission is cracking down on illegal state aid, and won a protracted legal battle with Apple in September 2024 when Europe’s highest court ordered the US tech giant to pay €13 billion in back taxes to Ireland.

“I also do not rule out the possibility that the Shell files may prompt the European Commission to launch an investigation into unlawful state aid,” said van de Streek.

Meanwhile, Kiezebrink explained how the United Nations has been working for several years on a process to tackle this kind of tax avoidance.

“On the initiative of the group of African states, negotiations are now under way for a global treaty, which could lead to an end to the failing transfer pricing system,” he added.

“Unfortunately, many OECD countries, including the Netherlands, do not yet seem prepared to contribute to meaningful change.”

Remarkably, a Shell employee sits on the UN committee responsible for developing new transfer pricing rules. And just this month, the oil giant’s transfer pricing team was nominated for a major award recognising the best tax practices across Europe.

Shell’s full response

We are clear and transparent on our tax positions in the Tax Contribution Reports, which we publish annually. We will not provide further details regarding our tax filings, as these are confidential and commercially sensitive.

We categorically reject any suggestion of involvement in illegal practices. Shell is fully committed to compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

On your specific comments concerning Shell’s cost contribution agreement, we note the following points:

Historical Approach: For years prior to 2019, under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (e.g., paragraphs 8.14–8.15), cost-based contributions without mark-up are considered a valid and legitimate pricing method. Such cost-based contributions are particularly appropriate where evidence shows that independent parties would accept this pricing under comparable conditions; this specifically applies to the oil and gas sector and Shell’s circumstances.

Post-2019 Adjustments: Since 2019, Shell plc has updated the ‘at cost’ compensation of service companies under its cost contribution agreement. While the ‘at cost’ approach continues to reflect commercial terms commonly agreed between independent parties in the oil and gas sector, Shell agreed with certain tax authorities to apply a taxable ‘deemed’ mark-up on services, in line with the guidance of Chapter VII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as updated in 2019. These mark-ups are benchmarked and comply with, and exceed, the threshold specified in Chapter VII (paragraph 7.43 and following). They have been disclosed and discussed with the tax authorities.

Jurisdictional and Joint Venture Constraints: Shell cannot charge-out these mark-ups in certain jurisdictions due to legal or joint venture constraints, which can result in double taxation.

Audit and Transparency: Our cost allocation system (and methodology) is reviewed and agreed by our external auditor.

A refined strategy: how Europe’s industry lobby managed to block sugar taxes

Irene van den Berg, Thin Lei Win (Lighthouse Reports) — Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What is the news?

An investigation by Follow the Money, in collaboration with Lighthouse Reports and a coalition of international media, shows that food and soft drink companies across Europe have used the same playbook to block sugar taxes: legal threats, economic warnings, and intensive lobbying campaigns.
Companies frequently invoke EU rules on state aid, competition, and the internal market. Even when these legal arguments fail to hold up, they often prove sufficient to create uncertainty among policymakers. In Finland, a tax on sweets and ice cream was eventually scrapped following complaints to the European Commission, while in Estonia a similar levy collapsed after the industry threatened to take the matter to Brussels.
This legal pressure is often accompanied by economic arguments. Companies warn of job losses, reduced investment and damage to the economy. In Portugal, Coca-Cola threatened to suspend a €40 million investment; in Italy, its national distributor warned that the proposed sugar tax would cost it around €140 million a year.
The strategy has repeatedly proved effective. Taxes are delayed, weakened or withdrawn altogether. At the European level, too, concrete plans for new fiscal measures to tackle obesity gradually disappeared from the agenda. Proposals for an EU-wide tax on sugary products, for instance, were dropped from successive European Commission health policy plans.

Why does this matter?

The World Health Organization (WHO) considers taxes on sugary drinks to be among the most effective tools for reducing sugar consumption.
Yet only about half of EU member states have introduced a tax on sugary beverages or other unhealthy food products.
The investigation shows that debates over sugar taxes are often about more than public health. They also reveal the extent to which large corporations are able to shape policy decisions at both the national and European levels.

How was this investigated?

As part of a collaboration with Lighthouse Reports and a coalition of international media, Follow the Money examined dozens of lobbying letters, consultation submissions, parliamentary records and policy documents from national governments and the European Commission.
FTM reconstructed how companies and industry groups intervened in debates over sugar taxes in countries including Finland, Italy, Estonia, Portugal, Denmark, and Norway.
The international consortium of media partners also analysed a database containing more than 239 lawsuits and legal actions used by food and soft drink companies worldwide to block or delay public health measures.

This article is part of an ongoing series.

The EU Files

When Finland’s finance ministry proposed ramping up taxes on sweets and chocolate in 2024, its inbox quickly filled up. Dozens of municipalities, employers’ organisations, tax advisers, food companies, and industry associations pushed back. The tax would cost jobs, drive away investment, and could even violate European law, they argued.

No company sounded the alarm more forcefully than Fazer. In more than half a dozen submissions, the chocolate maker, a Finnish national icon, warned that the measure amounted to unlawful state aid and was therefore illegal under EU law. The planned tax changes would also make future investment in Finland more difficult, the billion-euro firm said.

“They threatened that Finland will lose lots of working places. This would destroy the Finnish economy,” said Heli Kuusipalo, a senior researcher at the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare who has served on the government’s sugar tax working group.

The pressure worked: the government withdrew the plans. The case of Fazer in Finland is not an isolated one.

“The narrative of the industry can be so compelling that others start repeating it”

An investigation by Follow the Money, in collaboration with Lighthouse Reports and a coalition of international partners, shows that the food and soft drink industry has played a significant role in delaying, weakening, or derailing sugar taxes across the continent.

Across Europe, governments have increasingly turned to taxes on sugary products to curb sugar consumption. Yet only 13 of the 40 European countries surveyed currently have a dedicated sugar tax in place. Several others have postponed, repealed or watered down similar measures after intense political debate and industry opposition.

Companies routinely combine threats of litigation with warnings about job losses, declining investment and economic damage, arguments that often prove just as effective in shaping political debate, an analysis of dozens of lobbying letters sent by food companies to governments across Europe, shows.

“The narrative of the industry can be so compelling that others start repeating it,” said Jan Maarten de Vet, a researcher who has studied the effect of sugar taxes.

Legal threats

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), taxes on sugary drinks are among the most effective tools for reducing the consumption of sugary drinks. Yet only about half of EU member states have introduced such a tax. Norway and Finland even abolished taxes on sugary products, while Italy keeps postponing a tax which targets sugar-sweetened beverages. At the European level, too, plans for new taxes on sugary products quietly disappeared from the agenda.

“Legal threats are one of the common strategies they use to create a chilling effect”

Part of this development, experts told FTM, is because companies are threatening to sue governments who want to adopt a law aimed at curbing sugar consumption.

Kremlin Wickramasinghe, regional adviser for nutrition at the WHO’s Europe office, said that Finland was far from an isolated case.

“Legal threats are one of the common strategies they use to create a chilling effect,” he said.

Such threats do not even have to result in a court case to be effective. “One court case can take a lot of time and resources, and delay other policies.”

Amandine Garde, professor of law at the University of Liverpool, echoed the assessment. Companies invoked EU rules on state aid and the internal market to create uncertainty among policymakers, she said, even when those legal arguments were unlikely to succeed. “Playing on the fear of costly legal challenges is one of the strategies that the industry frequently deploys to avoid regulation,” she said.

This comes out of a playbook of how the food industry pushes back against public health measures worldwide.

Journalists from Lighthouse Reports and its media partners mapped 239 lawsuits and legal actions used by food and soft drink companies to block or delay public health measures between 2010 and 2025. A review of those legal cases in six countries – Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom – the investigation found that the industry ultimately lost around eight out of 10 lawsuits. Some of the cases have dragged on for more than a decade.

But, according to Garde, that didn’t matter so much to the companies: legal threats often succeeded in delaying policy measures for years, she said. “They’re using litigation threats for political purposes to weaken the political will that is already very, very weak,” she said. Politicians are often more concerned about immediate warnings of job losses and economic damage than the long-term health benefits of such taxes, she argued.

Economic powerhouses

Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Mondelēz, Kellogg’s, Ferrero and Danone alone – who generate hundreds of billions of euros in annual revenue – were involved in dozens of the legal cases, the analysis shows.

Politicians sometimes are reluctant to upset big companies, said Wickramasinghe, and are cautious about implementing policies that might push them away.

Threatening to go to court is an effective tool, according to Wickramasinghe. That’s because, he argued, many governments lack the expertise and manpower needed to withstand such lobbying campaigns.

“A lot of governments have very few people working on these files and one court case will take a lot of their time and resources and also delay many other policies they need to work on,” he said.

The industry portrays the law in ways that are often misleading

Like in Finland, industry groups in Estonia threatened legal action to fight a planned sugar tax. As parliament worked on the legislation in 2017, the soft drinks industry announced that it would take its case to the European Commission. According to industry associations, the tax amounted to unlawful state aid because certain products and sectors were exempted. As in Finland, the objection centred on alleged distortions of competition: some companies would be unfairly favoured, while others would face a disproportionate tax burden.

But that was, Garde argued, often not substantiated.“It’s up to member states to tax as they see fit,” Garde said – provided they do not discriminate against imported products. That means, for example, that a government can’t tax imported products more than products produced within its borders, as this would provide an unlawful competitive advantage to its domestic industry. Health taxation was lawful, she said, whilst protectionist policies were not.

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In practice, however, that threshold is rarely the problem. EU law does not prevent governments from introducing sugar taxes. It only prohibits discriminatory taxation that gives certain producers or comparable products an unfair advantage. In the countries examined for this investigation, most sugar taxes apply to all products within a defined category and therefore do not discriminate. According to Garde, the food industry often blurs that distinction.

“The industry portrays the law in ways that are often misleading,” Garde said. Still, it’s this point that would prove the stumbling block in Estonia, where the law fell in 2017 not because of the sugar tax itself, but because of aspects of it that risked giving certain sellers an advantage.

The law would have introduced a tax of 10 cents per litre if it contained more than 5 grammes per 100 ml, and 30 cents per litre if it contained more than 8 grammes per 100ml.

In a rare veto, the country’s president, Kersti Kaljulaid, put a stop to the law a few weeks after the parliament had approved it: soft drinks sold on board international flights and ferries were exempt from the tax. According to Kaljulaid, this gave one specific sector an unjustified advantage, and, with that, the law could violate the constitutional principle of equal treatment, she argued.

In 2024, Estonia introduced a new bill, this time without the legal exemptions. The tax is expected to come into force in 2026.

Economic damage

Estonia and Finland are not the only countries where sugar taxes have failed or been rolled back.

In Italy, too, industry used economic pressure to push back against planned sugar taxes – and successfully so. Soft drinks association Assobibe warned that the proposed levy put around 5,000 jobs at risk, drive up prices and cause major financial losses for producers, dismissing claims about its public health benefits as “fake news”.

Coca-Cola HBC Italia, the company that distributes Coca-Cola products in Italy, echoed those concerns. It estimated that the tax would cost the company around €140 million a year and warned that factories and future investments could be put at risk, while urging the government to return to the negotiating table with the industry.

The strategy seems to have paid off: while the new taxes were officially adopted in 2020, Italy repeatedly delayed its implementation. It is currently set to enter into force in January 2027.

Companies had made that same argument in the UK, which announced sugar taxes in 2016. Franco Sassi, who researches international health policy at the Imperial College London, said that this hadn’t materialised: virtually all major manufacturers reduced the sugar content of their products or introduced lower-sugar alternatives. Research by Sassi and colleagues shows that the sugar content of purchased soft drinks fell by 41% between 2015 and 2019. According to a November 2025 economic evaluation, around 80% of the reduction in calorie intake was attributable to manufacturers reformulating their products, while the remainder reflected changes in consumers’ purchasing behaviour.

Does the tax work?

The effectiveness of sugar taxes is also frequently challenged in industry lobbying documents. In one consultation submission, Fazer cites research suggesting that Finns consumed more biscuits after a tax on sweets and chocolate was introduced. According to the company, this shows that consumers simply switch to other sweet products rather than reducing their overall sugar consumption.

For public health researcher Wilma Waterlander, from the Amsterdam University Medical Center), this is a familiar but flawed argument. “There is very strong scientific evidence that pricing measures work – and sugar taxes are a prime example,” she said. For decades, Waterlander has studied how taxes and price increases influence what people eat and drink and found the same pattern: when unhealthy products became more expensive, people bought significantly fewer of them. “People sometimes switch to a different product, but overall, a sugar tax leads to healthier food purchases,” she said.

Waterlander’s findings are far from unique. The WHO already concluded in 2015 that sugar taxes are an effective public health measure.

Norway, too, had imposed taxes on soft drinks, sweets, and chocolate for nearly a century. When the government announced a sharp increase in those levies in late 2017, the food industry swiftly pushed back. Industry association FoodDrinkNorway filed a complaint with an internal markets watchdog, arguing that the tax increases could amount to unlawful state aid because comparable products were treated differently. In a supplementary complaint supporting the case, confectionery manufacturer Hval argued that “the arbitrary and discriminatory product scope of the Levy produces a direct and substantial competition distortion”.

In 2021, Norway abolished both the chocolate and sugar tax and the soft drinks tax, citing growing cross-border shopping, concerns about the competitiveness of Norwegian businesses, and doubts about whether the levies were an effective public health measure, echoing concerns by industry.

For economist Sinne Smed, who served on a Norwegian commission on food taxation, the focus on cross-border shopping overshadowed the original purpose of the tax. “This is always a large, large argument against taxes,” she said. The debate, she recalled in an interview, was barely about public health at all. “There was never any real discussion about the health effects.”

The EU Files

What is transpiring within the European Union? What are the goals and aspirations of the EU, and how is the budget allocated?

Instead, the focus shifted to whether consumers would simply move their purchases across the border. But while such a risk exists, a 2024 European study paints a more nuanced picture. Cross-border shopping appears to be largely a local phenomenon concentrated in specific border regions. At the national level – and even more so across Europe as a whole – the effects are limited and driven primarily by a small number of so-called “hotspots”.

Today, only Hungary and Slovakia still maintain taxes that targeted unhealthy foods more broadly within Europe. Since 2011, Hungary has imposed a so-called junk food tax on products including energy drinks, chips, sugary breakfast cereals, and other highly processed foods. There, too, the industry attempted to block the measure through Brussels. Manufacturers complained to the European Commission that the tax discriminated against foreign companies and distorted the internal market. The Commission rejected the complaint, concluding that the levy had no significant impact on international trade. The Hungarian tax remained in place.

Slovakia introduced a tax on sugary drinks in 2025 and later expanded its approach by applying a higher VAT rate to a broad range of sugary and salty foods.

Portugal pushes back

“Coca-Cola has announced that it will suspend a €40 million investment, worth more than 100 jobs, if this measure goes ahead,” Portuguese lawmaker Pedro Mota Soares, of the People’s Party, told parliament in 2017. He wanted the country’s finance minister, Manuel Caldeira Cabral, to abandon plans for a soft drinks tax.

It didn’t work. “I believe the government should not pay attention to this kind of blackmail,” the minister retorted.

Coca-Cola pulled out all the stops to block the planned tax, which would have made a 330-millilitre can of cola around 5.5 cents more expensive. The beverage giant described the tax as unconstitutional and incompatible with EU and trade rules. It also increased pressure through lobbying letters sent to politicians and placing advertisements advocating against the law in a newspaper.

The Portuguese government stood firm and adopted the tax that same year. “That was very brave. We need more politicians like that,” said public health doctor Carolina Baptista. The tax proved effective. To qualify for a lower tax bracket, soft drink manufacturers substantially reduced the sugar content of their products. According to research, this reformulation led to an 11% reduction in energy intake from sugary drinks among the Portuguese population.

EU approach

Wickramasinghe argued that countries could reduce industry pressure by introducing a common tax, and, with that, counter arguments of cross-border shopping and economic harm.

“They are more successful if all the countries implement [the taxes] together,” he said.

Yet it’s precisely this common approach that Europe has not been able to agree on, he said.

Last year, the European Commission was exploring the feasibility of sugar taxes – and the food industry jumped into action, apparently seeking to influence the policymaking process. In late November 2025, for example, lobby group FoodDrinkEurope met with David Boublil, head of the Commission’s behavioural taxation unit, to discuss “food and sugar taxation”. FoodDrinkEurope’s members include companies such as Coca-Cola, Mars, and Nestlé.

“If you ask what has happened since, I don’t see much. Everyone is concerned about the cost of the shopping basket”

Around the same time, European ambitions were being scaled back. A leaked draft of the EU executive’s plan to address cardiovascular health from February 2025 still referred to exploring fiscal measures on the European level, including a possible levy on ultra-processed foods. It also identified sugar-sweetened beverages as the category of products with the greatest potential for action. In the final version, published in December that year, the passage had been replaced with a much vaguer statement: taxes can influence consumer behaviour.

A more substantial follow-up did not emerge until May 2025, this time from the Commission’s department for taxation and customs, DG TAXUD. Unlike earlier initiatives, the exploratory study explicitly examined the possibility of a harmonised European tax on unhealthy food products and minimum tax harmonisation for sugary drinks – but that seems to have fallen on deaf ears.

Researcher De Vet, one of the study’s authors, said that with shifting political priorities, as well as rising food prices and concerns about inflation, new taxes had become unpopular.

“If you ask what has happened since, I don’t see much,” he said. “Everyone is concerned about the cost of the shopping basket.”

The Commission stressed that the study had been intended as a basis for further discussion. “DG Taxud is using the findings of the study to continue the dialogue with Member States, engage with stakeholders and encourage the exchange of information and best practices,” a spokesperson said.

But the study did not go unnoticed by companies.

The day after the report was released, soft drink trade association UNESDA dismissed the study as misleading and insufficiently substantiated. UNESDA told FTM that because obesity and other health issues were complex, a tax on a single product could never be effective.

A single government can block an entire proposal

“These taxes fail to lead to meaningful health improvements. It is unrealistic to expect soft drinks taxes to reduce obesity rates,” a spokesperson said. Instead, UNESDA argued that governments should encourage voluntary sugar reduction and action across the entire food and drink industry.

Garde, meanwhile, has little confidence that a coordinated European sugar tax will materialise any time soon. The obstacle was not only political resistance, she said, but also the fact that harmonisation of taxes would need unanimous support from EU countries. “A single government can block an entire proposal,” she said.

According to Garde, the political climate in Brussels has also shifted dramatically. Where the Commission once explored fiscal measures to improve public health, competitiveness and deregulation now seemed to dominate the EU’s policy agenda, she said. “I think that in this climate the hope for EU level, at the moment, it’s nil.”

This investigation is part of a cross-border collaboration led by Lighthouse Reports and involving Follow the Money, Agência Pública, Cuestión Pública, The Guardian, Il Fatto Alimentare, L’Espresso, Lighthouse Reports, O Joio e O Trigo, Quinto Elemento Lab, Santa Cruz Local and The Wire.

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The Commission’s transparency problem, in its own words

Alexander Fanta, Peter Teffer, Salsabil Fayed — Mon, 20 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Welcome back to Bureau Brussels – your weekly deep dive into the power plays, backroom deals, and investigations shaping life for millions of people across the bloc.

What’s in store this week?

The Commission’s transparency reforms, fact-checked
Is Brussels cutting red tape or weakening tax rules?
Our journalist gets lost in the EU’s bureaucratic maze

STORY OF THE WEEK

The Commission’s transparency problem, in its own words

On Monday, European Commissioner Piotr Serafin presented proposals to shake up Brussels’ often arcane ways of working at an all-hands meeting. The recommendations, distilled from nine months of work by 150 officials, promptly leaked to the press. We got a copy from our friends at Contexte.

The paper calls for a Brussels perestroika (late Soviet speak for “restructuring”). It targets the European Commission’s approach to transparency, particularly its access to documents procedure – the official name for the EU’s freedom of information system. According to the paper, the process is “under strain from obsolete concepts, inconsistent filing practices, the growing volume of requests, [and] high transaction costs linked to manual redaction”.

According to a Commission insider, the unnamed authors are senior officials with intimate knowledge of how the institution works. They call for clearer guidance, better tools, and stronger operational support for handling information requests. They’re also pushing for “better filing and archiving practices”. It's hard not to see this as a nod to Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen’s frequently disappearing texts.

Some of the measures are welcome. Others are not. The document contains a worrying stab against transparency. It wrongly claims that access to documents requests are increasing. The Commission’s own annual reports show otherwise: requests have been falling in recent years. Based on this bogus claim, the authors argue that transparency makes it “harder to preserve a safe space for internal policy development that fosters experimentation and responsible risk-taking”.

Anyone who knows their way around the law – and the Commission’s transparency practices – are likely sceptical. EU rules allow institutions to withhold documents if disclosure would harm internal decision-making, and courts have repeatedly backed their need for a “space to think”. What’s more, von der Leyen tightened the existing rules for the document retrieval process days after the start of her second mandate in December 2024.

This is only the opening act. In October, a high-ranking group of external experts led by former Commission Secretary General Catherine Day will weigh in on the recommendations. This will ultimately lead to a formal report by Commissioner Serafin, to be adopted by his colleagues in the College of Commissioners. Whether Brussels gets its promised perestroika – or even a little glasnost, Soviet speak for openness – remains to be seen.

Alexander Fanta

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Fifty years ago, The Twelve Tasks of Asterix, the French animated classic, hit cinemas. One of its most memorable moments sees protagonist Astérix trapped in an endless loop of bureaucracy with every official sending him to another desk. I’ve been feeling a bit like the moustachioed Gaul myself lately. I’ve been trying to obtain two reports from the EU’s anti-fraud agency OLAF about a private distributor of grants from the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT). OLAF said it couldn’t release them because the EIT was still carrying out “follow-up procedures” based on the reports. But when asked what these procedures were – and why they prevented publication – the EIT replied that OLAF reports were confidential. “As they are not EIT documents, the EIT is not authorised to disclose them or comment on this aspect.” Ils sont fous...

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Is the EU reducing red tape or opening the door to tax avoidance?

The European Parliament’s tax subcommittee (FISC) put the Commission’s Direct Tax Omnibus package under the microscope last Tuesday. The proposal aims to simplify EU tax legislation. During the panel, experts welcomed the efforts to reduce administrative burdens, but cautioned against weakening anti-tax avoidance safeguards. Many stressed that simplification should not come at the expense of transparency, legal certainty, or effective enforcement. Members of European Parliament (MEPs) also questioned whether the proposal strikes the right balance between boosting competitiveness and preserving fair taxation across the Union.

Salsabil Fayed

Our latest investigations

FIFA risks prosecution over World Cup payments to Russian clubs

As the World Cup nears its finale, FIFA is already in hot water. Could it be heading for a red card? After controversy over its ties to Donald Trump, FIFA risks prosecution for sending $1.2 million to Russian clubs linked to sanctioned entities. With another round of payments approaching, will FIFA risk repeating the same foul?

Read the full article

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Who’s playing by the rules?

Eve Moore — Sat, 18 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Dear reader,

This week, we uncover the network helping the far right weaken Europe’s green laws, examine the European Commission’s secrecy over EU-funded projects in Gaza, and ask whether Spain really is Europe’s progressive poster child. Elsewhere, our partners reveal how an EU-funded security project links European public bodies to Israel’s state-owned arms industry.

Here’s your weekly investigative briefing.

From Us:

FIFA risks prosecution over World Cup payments to Russian clubs

Read the full article

Podcast | Special: Is Spain really Europe’s progressive poster child?

Crime & Corruption: EU prosecutor’s office: more members, more problems?

What happens now that Hungary has officially joined the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)? FTM journalists Salsabil Fayed and Simon Van Dorpe unpack what this news means as the body’s leadership undergoes major changes. The newsletter also examines renewed scrutiny of FIFA over the suspension of a US player and the US administration’s latest offensive against the International Criminal Court.

🔗 Read the latest edition here and subscribe here

Secrecy Tracker: Commission buries Gaza audits as EU top court faces transparency backlash

Produced in collaboration with Investigate Europe and EUobserver, we examined the Commission’s refusal to disclose details of EU-funded infrastructure projects in Gaza, the politics behind the decision, and what it means for democracy. We also took a closer look at Germany’s plans to scale back its freedom of information law, and renewed scrutiny of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s text messages.

🔗 Read the latest edition here and subscribe here

Meet the Austrian businessman harnessing the far-right to cut Europe’s green laws

The far right is gaining power. Europe's green laws are paying the price. As politics shifted right, a powerful but little-known network built over decades by Austrian businessman and former MEP Paul Rübig seized the opportunity.

Through a web of influential business and political groups, Rübig brought together business interests, Christian Democrats, and US lobbyists. Our investigation reveals how his network capitalised on Europe’s shift to the right to push deregulation and weaken landmark sustainability rules.

Read the latest edition

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From friends of FTM:

EU-funded UnderSec project includes Israeli state arms company

A cross-border investigation by Altreconomia, Público, and others found that UnderSec, a €6 million project funded by an EU research programme, includes Israel’s state-owned arms company Rafael as well as Spanish and Greek public bodies. The project is developing underwater port security technologies despite calls to exclude Israeli defence entities from EU research funding. The investigation also criticises the project’s lack of transparency and concerns about the environmental impact of its sonar tests.

Video of the week:

Is FIFA heading for a red card? After controversy over its ties to Donald Trump, the international football association risks prosecution for sending $1.2mn to Russian clubs linked to sanctioned figures. With another round of payments approaching, will FIFA risk repeating the same foul?

🔗 Want to Listen to our recent podcast about the story here and read the full investigation here

Until next week

We’re also on a mission to break up with American Big Tech. Learn why digital autonomy matters to us.

Got feedback, tips, or story ideas? Get in touch at info@ftm.nl

FIFA risks prosecution over World Cup payments to Russian clubs

Krijn Schramade — Sat, 18 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in one minute

What’s the news?

FIFA shared the proceeds from the World Cup in Qatar with Russian clubs whose owners or principal sponsors are subject to sanctions imposed by the United States or the European Union, Follow the Money found.
This year, following the World Cup in the United States, FIFA has even more money set aside for clubs that released players to their national teams. Russian football clubs are set to benefit from this too.

Why does it matter?

These payments contravene international sanctions imposed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and could lead to criminal prosecution.

How was it investigated?

Follow the Money examined FIFA reports to check which Russian clubs had received World Cup payments, and found that all but one of these clubs were linked to sanctioned entities. We also spoke to legal experts to understand the risks FIFA was taking with these continued payouts.

This article is part of an ongoing series.

Offside Deals

When FIFA President Gianni Infantino welcomed football executives from around the globe to the Qatar World Cup in 2022, he boasted that payouts to national associations had increased eight-fold under his leadership.

“Every association around the world [now] receives at least $2 million every year as a minimum,” he said.

On top of this sum comes the Club Benefits Programme, through which associations receive money to distribute to clubs that release players to national teams during the World Cup. For the 2022 tournament, this fund totalled $209 million.

At the time, those applauding executives presumably did not realise that FIFA would land itself in legal hot water with this lavish spending programme – nor that the international football federation would be compounding the mistake in 2026. For the World Cup in the US, Canada and Mexico, the total pot for the Club Benefits Programme stands at $355 million.

The millions handed out by the FIFA president are distributed across the globe. This includes Russian clubs whose owner or principal sponsor is subject to sanctions imposed by the United States or the European Union, according to research by Follow the Money.

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That could prove costly for football’s governing body.

FIFA falls under US sanctions legislation, not just because the 2026 World Cup is being jointly held in the US but also because of sponsorship deals with companies such as Visa and Coca-Cola, and because of its offices in Miami and Trump Tower in New York.

FIFA is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, and must therefore also comply with Swiss laws and regulations, which follow the European Union’s sanctions regime.

Sanctioned gas and oil companies

Through its Club Benefits Programme, FIFA paid $1.2 million to six Russian clubs following the World Cup in Qatar, according to an official report from July 2023.

Zenit St Petersburg, for example, received nearly $500,000. The club is owned by Gazprombank, which is in turn owned by the oil and gas company Gazprom, an entity sanctioned by the United States.

Anything you do with them, directly or indirectly, makes you infected too

Other clubs that received funds include Dynamo Moscow ($361,364), CSKA Moscow ($159,693), Rubin Kazan ($91,253) and Lokomotiv Moscow ($80,303).

All of these clubs are linked to international sanctions through an owner or principal sponsor. As far as is known, this does not apply to FK Krasnodar, which received $60,227.

Payments such as these were channelled through the national football associations to all 440 clubs that released players to take part in the tournament in Qatar. In May 2023, the associations received written instructions to transfer the funds: “These sums are due to the clubs.”

A similar scenario is set to unfold following the 2026 World Cup.

The Russia Files

There’s a war raging on European soil. What consequences does Putin’s war against Ukraine have for Europe?

Spartak Moscow, among others, can now expect to receive funds. The club released midfielder Théo Bongonda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo national team, which reached the first knockout round after a memorable victory over Uzbekistan.

Spartak is owned by Lukoil, Russia’s largest oil company. In October 2025, US President Donald Trump imposed fresh sanctions on Lukoil.

Risk of infection

By making these payments to Russian clubs, FIFA is entering legally risky territory.

The same applies to the fixed annual contribution it pays to all football associations. Intended to support national teams and the development of the game, this funding also goes to the Russian Football Union.

The Russian association receives around $2 million each year, even though its president, Alexander Dyukov – who is also the chief executive of Gazprom – was personally sanctioned by the United States in January 2025.

In any event, FIFA cannot hide behind the argument that the Russian football clubs themselves are not directly subject to sanctions.

“Violating sanctions is a form of international organised crime and can be punished with a prison sentence”

The Netherlands-based lawyer Heleen Over de Linden, who works on cases related to Russia sanctions, said that “absolutely nothing” is permitted once a club owner or major sponsor is subject to sanctions. Funds simply cannot be allocated “if this directly or indirectly benefits a sanctioned person or entity”.

Over de Linden compared it to dealing with a person who is suffering from a highly infectious disease: “Anything you do with them, directly or indirectly, makes you infected too.”

To illustrate the point, she referred to a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which held that shareholders of a subsidiary are also covered by sanctions imposed on the parent company.

According to her, exceptions are only possible if FIFA has obtained an exemption from the Swiss and US authorities allowing payments to Russia. As far as is known, no such exemption has been granted.

‘International organised crime’

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the highest tribunal in international sport, did rule on the issue in 2025. The case concerned a transfer fee that West Ham United refused to pay to CSKA Moscow because the club’s owner was subject to sanctions. CAS upheld West Ham’s position.

FIFA took a different approach, as a 2025 investigation by Follow the Money revealed. “The existence of sanctions has no effect on the existence and expiry date of a debt,” the international football association ruled in cases involving payment problems to Russia.

Clubs in arrears are ordered to settle their debts within 45 days. If they fail to do so, they face a transfer ban covering three transfer windows.

According to Markus Mohler, a Swiss criminal law expert, this is “not a standalone breach of the sanctions provisions” by clubs but “a breach imposed” by FIFA. Mohler described this as “coercion” and said it constitutes a criminal offence under the Swiss Criminal Code.

Coercion was also an issue in West Ham United’s dispute with CSKA Moscow. Over de Linden said it became clear at the time that FIFA was siding with the Russian club.

An undue attempt to circumvent the applicable sanction regimes

In 2023, CSKA proposed a series of arrangements designed to circumvent the sanctions.

The club suggested, for example, private payments via an investment firm in Hong Kong, payments via the Russian Premier League into an account at Raiffeisenbank in Moscow, or offsetting the debt against money owed by CSKA to SC Heerenveen.

FIFA held West Ham responsible for refusing to agree to these “proactive” solutions proposed by CSKA. The Court of Arbitration for Sport later ruled, however, that those payment methods – without the approval of the relevant authorities – amounted to “an undue attempt to circumvent the applicable sanction regimes”.

Responding to Follow the Money’s findings, the Swiss sanctions authority SECO said that “in principle, it is prohibited to make funds and economic resources available to sanctioned entities”. SECO declined to comment on individual cases, but said it “systematically follows up on indications of alleged sanctions violations and consistently prosecutes such violations”.

The US sanctions authority did not respond to a request to comment, while the FBI declined to comment on the findings.

FIFA did not respond to questions from Follow the Money. Nor did the Russian Football Union or any of the clubs mentioned.

Over de Linden believes FIFA is behaving as though it is above the law.

“Violating sanctions is a form of international organised crime and can be punished with a prison sentence of up to six years,” she said.

EU prosecutor’s office: more members, more problems?

Simon Van Dorpe, Salsabil Fayed — Wed, 15 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Dear readers,

The year has passed quickly, and the Crime and Corruption newsletter is heading into a summer hiatus. We are deeply proud of our expanding audience week after week, and we are already eager to return to our coverage of a subject that, sadly, only gains significance.

We hope you also get the chance to rest, and we look forward to returning in early September!

What’s in store this week:

Hungary finally joins EPPO, while its leadership transforms
FIFA faces heat over US player’s suspension
US launches offensive against the International Criminal Court

EU prosecutor’s office: more members, more problems?

Friday’s official announcement that Hungary will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) marks a major step in the fight against corruption with EU money. But the office’s relative independence from other EU institutions comes with an increased dependence on participating countries.

The EPPO is replacing much of its leadership five years after its launch. European Chief Prosecutor Laura Kövesi will be succeeded by Germany’s Andrés Ritter on 1 November. Eight countries are swapping their representative to the Luxembourg-based office.

The EPPO’s refreshingly independent stance towards other EU institutions and its promising first results for the EU budget have earned it a lot of praise across the union. After Poland and Sweden in 2024, Hungary’s membership with the EPPO comes after years of opposition from former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The move was also part of a deal struck to unfreeze over €16 billion in EU funds under Orbán. (It remains to be seen, however, whether the government under the new prime minister, Péter Magyar’s, will provide the resources the EPPO needs to investigate corruption from the Orbán era.)

Hungary’s EPPO membership is also significant because, with all EU countries now members – barring Ireland, which is expected to join next year, and Denmark – participation will be mandatory for all future EU entrants. That includes those with low corruption index scores like Albania and Ukraine.

For the appointment of new prosecutors, the EPPO depends on its member states, which each propose three candidates to be their new “European prosecutor”. They then jointly vote on the appointment. But as the prosecutor is inevitably confronted with corruption at national level, that process threatens to become more complex.

So far, all is still relatively smooth. The next European prosecutors for Belgium, Czechia, France, and Malta have been approved by the Council of the European Union. The mandate of their predecessors ends later this month. Germany has until November to find a replacement for Ritter. The process for the Slovenian candidate is advancing, but the Bulgarian and Slovakian appointments are stuck.

The previous European prosecutor for Bulgaria, Teodora Georgieva, was suspended by EPPO for “serious misconduct”. The EPPO asked the European Commission, European Parliament, and the Council to propose her dismissal to the court, but they rejected, according to two people familiar with the matter.

Regardless, the end of Georgieva’s term was approaching. The process to replace her has been caught up in Bulgarian turmoil. In January, the outgoing government of Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov submitted three names, but they were withdrawn in February by a caretaker government. The three candidates challenged that decision before Bulgaria’s Supreme Administrative Court, which annulled the withdrawal in July (after Rumen Radev took over as Prime Minister).

FIFA under fresh scrutiny over suspension of US player

New revelations have deepened questions about FIFA’s handling of the controversial suspension of US striker Folarin Balogun during a recent 2026 World Cup game.

According to The Times, the decision to suspend Balogun’s automatic one-match ban was taken unilaterally by Mohammad Al-Kamali, chairman of FIFA’s disciplinary committee, without consulting the committee’s 17 other members. The move allowed Balogun to play Belgium, just hours after FIFA rejected an appeal by the Belgian football association.

Under FIFA’s disciplinary code, the chairperson of the committee can act as a “single judge” to make rulings. Al-Kamali has clearly availed of this provision, having ruled alone for the last 110 published decisions.

These recent events have fuelled ongoing criticism of FIFA’s political neutrality. More than 20 EU lawmakers have called for FIFA’s ethics committee to be investigated over political influence.

The case was already under fire after US President Donald Trump publicly stated that he had contacted FIFA president Gianni Infantino about the player’s red card. FIFA insists the ruling was made independently under Article 27 of its Disciplinary Code, but has yet to publish a detailed legal justification.

Rather than being an isolated incident, the Balogun controversy has reignited a wider debate over FIFA’s governance, transparency, and political independence, questioning whether the organisation’s disciplinary system requires structural reform.

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US attack on criminal court

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio went all out against the International Criminal Court (ICC) on Monday, accusing it of “targeting American servicemen” and “threatening American sovereignty”. Rubio’s campaign will feature a “whole-of-government response” to disable the ICC’s ability to operate. This includes pressuring other countries to “reject the ICC’s fake authority”.

The campaign is a reaction to a lawsuit filed at the end of June in New York, in which three sanctioned ICC judges sued the Trump administration, arguing that the sanctions were unlawful and coercive. It also serves to deter future scrutiny, protecting Israeli and US officials over their actions in Gaza or Afghanistan.

A Commission spokesperson said in response that “the Commission remains firmly committed to supporting the International Criminal Court as a cornerstone of international justice and to safeguarding its independence and proper functioning”.

Podcast | Special: Is Spain really Europe’s progressive poster child?

Emma du Chatinier — Wed, 15 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Commission buries Gaza audits as EU top court faces transparency backlash

Alexander Fanta, EUobserver, Investigate Europe — Tue, 14 Jul 2026 06:00:00 GMT

Dear readers,

We are back with a new issue of the Secrecy Tracker – your regular update on what the EU institutions prefer to keep under wraps.

I am Nikolaj Nielsen, a reporter at EUobserver, who has for years struggled to gain access to EU documents.

I wrote this newsletter in collaboration with EUobserver’s Elena Sánchez Nicolás, Alexander Fanta from Follow the Money, and Pascal Hansens from Investigate Europe.

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This introduction is less a rant about the European Commission’s poor record on accountability and transparency, and more warning about a worrying pattern: a powerful institution appears to let political alignments shape whether it releases even the most basic information.

In public, the Commission likes to say it is the largest donor of external assistance to the Palestinians, with more than €1 billion pledged between 2021 and 2024, and that it supports a two-state solution.

But getting access to how that money was spent, even on basic physical infrastructure projects in Gaza before the Hamas attacks in October 2023, has proved near impossible.

The source of that frustration leads back to Michael Karnitschnig, the acting director general of the Commission branch dealing with the Middle East (DG MENA).

We don’t know the Austrian’s personal views on Gaza or Israel. But his paymaster, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, has clearly been reluctant to take steps that would seriously upset Israel.

Last year, she proposed a partial suspension of the trade-related provisions of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, but later said such a move would require unanimous approval from all 27 member states, effectively making it impossible even though other options would only have needed a qualified majority.

That kind of procedural railroading trickles down to von der Leyen’s subordinates, and likely colours their decisions when it comes to transparency on anything related to Gaza or the West Bank.

Karnitschnig holds 17 documents, many of them audit reports, on EU funding used to finance physical infrastructure projects in Gaza, including water supply, stormwater management, sanitation, and renewable energy.

I saw some of these projects in Gaza first-hand years ago, and they genuinely improved daily life.

It is reasonable to assume that many, if not most, have since been destroyed during Israel’s military campaign, which has killed more than 70,000 people in the enclave. Despite the reporting gaps, that added up to a probable Gaza-EU price tag well north of €155 million, according to a recent investigation by EUobserver.

Karnitschnig refuses to release anything to the public, citing no overriding public interest — in comments he made the very same day the UN human rights office called out a genocide in Gaza.

But notably he also claims that releasing information about critical infrastructure in Gaza “could undermine the bilateral relations of the European Union with Palestine”.

Never mind the usual questions that follow such arguments. But if Karnitschnig was sitting with me now, I’d ask him to explain how disclosing information about infrastructure that is already demolished can pose a foreseeable security or diplomatic risk.

The argument is even sillier given that Karnitschnig points to public URLs describing each project, its location and purpose. One of them sought to help treat water in Khan Younis, a city in the southern Gaza Strip. It has been wiped from the map, following the Israeli ground invasion in 2023.

The only plausible explanation is politics. And that is a dangerous precedent for an EU institution that likes to label itself as a torchbearer of democratic principles and impartiality.

EU Ombudswoman challenges top court over lack of transparency

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is not exactly an institution that would win a prize for transparency. It is an observer of the inter-institutional ethics body, not a full member.

It is not subject to our beloved regulation 1049/2001 on public access to documents, has no transparency register, and operates according to its own rules.

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cannot submit parliamentary questions, whether on judicial documents or administrative matters.

That lack of scrutiny intrigued us. After several months of research, Investigate Europe published an investigation on 30 June, together with Follow the Money, EUobserver, and four other national media outlets.

We revealed that around 40% of court members held financial interests in private-sector companies, including TotalEnergies, Airbus and AstraZeneca.

In some instances, jurists worked on cases involving companies or competitors where they had registered a financial interest, raising questions about perceived potential conflicts and the court’s system to safeguard against such risks. Many more sat on cases concerning industries where they also have declared financial interests.

The investigation also found a paradox at the heart of the court’s transparency regime: declarations of interests are public while current. But once updated, previous versions are classified as judicial documents and disappear from public view.

The EU Ombudwosman, Teresa Anjinho, opened an inquiry into the EU top court’s refusal to grant public access to past declarations of interest filed by its judges and advocates general.

She questioned why declarations of interest by court members should be treated as entirely exempt “judicial documents”, pointing out that the jurisdiction itself had previously “published on its website such documents proactively”, meaning they had “already entered the public domain”.

Compared with other EU institutions, whose declarations of interests are under public-access rules, Anjinho argued that the court must explain why its members’ declarations, once made public, should now be shielded from disclosure.

The investigation has already triggered some impact: more than 30 declarations of interests were updated by judges and advocates general in the wake of Investigate Europe’s questions to the court.

General Court President Marc van der Woude confirmed plans to strengthen the system of declaring and monitoring interests, including through AI tools. On top of that, a parliamentary question was asked to the Council to clarify the safeguards when appointing an EU court member.

Pushback against Germany’s plans to curb transparency law

The German coalition government of Conservatives and Social Democrats is facing fierce pushback from journalists and civil society against plans, first revealed in July, to severely limit the country’s transparency legislation

Informationsfreiheitsgesetz, Germany’s 20-year-old freedom of information law, was never the strongest to begin with. People using the law face administrative fees of up to €500, and authorities often take months to respond to requests.

Yet, the coalition government presented a political agreement that would largely neuter the law as a tool for journalists.

According to the draft plans, future applicants must be German legal residents who can demonstrate a “legitimate interest” in the information they seek.

Names of all officials shall be redacted from documents for their protection, and any information related to critical infrastructure, counter-espionage and the fight against terrorism, or scientific research shall be placed under additional protection from disclosure. Lastly, fees shall be raised to cover administrative costs - which could easily run into the thousands of euros for every request.

These changes “amount to the abolition of the freedom of information that has been in place for 20 years”, said Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider, the federal commissioner for data protection and freedom of information, an official watchdog.

Arne Semsrott of the transparency NGO FragDenStaat called the plans the “the most serious attack on government transparency in the history of the Federal Republic”. Journalists, press freedom advocates and opposition parties joined in defending the existing law.

In the wake of the pushback, Social Democratic MPs in the German parliament signalled their opposition to the changes. “There must be no reduction in the existing rights to information for citizens, the press, and civil society”, a part of the party group in the Bundestag said in a public statement. An online petition against the plan has already collected more than 400,000 signatures.

Alas, so far the government shows no sign of backing down. The reform, once presented to parliament, is expected to turn into a messy political fight - with much at stake for the German press and civil society.

Von der Leyen’s texts under scrutiny – again

The European Ombudswoman has opened a new inquiry into the texting habits of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

This time, the probe will focus on whether the Commission mishandled Follow the Money’s access request for messages from a group chat between von der Leyen and leaders including France’s Emanuel Macron and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky.

The existence of the group chat, which is called “Washington Group” and allegedly used by around 35 world leaders to discuss how to deal with the whims of US President Donald Trump, was first revealed by Politico in January.

The Commission denied the access request, citing the need to protect the EU’s external relations, but refused to state whether it kept the texts.

A previous Ombudswoman inquiry, also following a complaint by Follow the Money, blasted the Commission for auto-deleting a message from Macron to von der Leyen about the Mercosur trade deal.

The watchdog told the Commission it needs to keep, “for a reasonable period”, all text and instant messages exchanged between heads of state or government, or ministers, and members of the Commission.

More transparency on beneficial ownership across the EU

The CJEU delivered a landmark ruling in May to clarify that financial transparency over beneficial ownership (information showing who ultimately owns or controls a company or asset) is compatible with the EU. This information is key in the fight against corruption and money laundering.

The dispute dates back to 2022, when the CJEU struck down a provision of the EU’s anti-money laundering directive (AMLD5) that required beneficial ownership registers to be completely open to the general public. Back then, the top court found that unlimited public access created a disproportionate interference with privacy and data protection rights.

Following that decision, several EU member states restricted access to their beneficial ownership databases, hindering the work of investigative journalists, civil society organisations, researchers, and others who use ownership data to expose corruption, hidden assets, shell companies, and sanctions evasion.

The 2026 ruling establishes a sort of middle ground: unrestricted public access is not permitted, but access based on a demonstrated “legitimate interest” is legally valid.

The case covered Italy’s use of the fiduciary mandate. Under this arrangement, a trust company manages assets on behalf of a beneficiary without formally becoming the legal owner. Several Italian fiduciary companies argued that because ownership was never transferred, these arrangements should not be treated like trusts under EU transparency rules.

But the EU’s top court rejected this argument. The court found that fiduciary mandates create an “interposition effect,” allowing individuals to conceal their control over assets behind another legal entity. As a result, these structures must face the same transparency requirements as comparable trust arrangements.

The decision comes as the EU implements its updated anti-money laundering rules, providing clarity for authorities on reopening beneficial ownership registers while maintaining privacy safeguards.

Reporters frustrated by EU transparency failure, survey finds

According to 35 responses Investigate Europe received to a home-grown survey on journalists’ experiences with access-to-documents requests to EU institutions, more than 70%of respondents said they had often or always experienced deadline extensions by EU institutions, mainly with the Commission.

A total of 80% said replies took between one and three months, while 7% reported waiting more than six months.

“The fact that it takes a very long time before documents are sent through makes it less interesting in terms of coverage. Sometimes the timing of the publication matters,” one respondent explained.

Indeed, 53% of respondents said they had sometimes or often abandoned a request process. When asked whether current access-to-documents institutional practices limit their ability to investigate EU matters, 73% said this happened often or always. This figure rose to 89% when including those who said it happened sometimes.

The quality of the documents shared was frequently criticised.

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“The access-to-documents service has deteriorated dramatically under the current European Commission president. I no longer see applications as worth pursuing because newsworthy information will simply not be released, in case it leads to a news story, which defeats the purpose of such an application in the first place,” one respondent said.

Refusals are also problematic. The three main grounds for refusal cited were international relations, the protection of commercial interests, and ongoing proceedings.

Some responses suggest that the Commission does not always reply in good faith. One respondent, for instance, said that a trusted Commission source had shared a document that was declared non-existent in response to their access-to-documents request.

Get in touch

If you come across any good examples of EU institutions dealing with transparency (or failing to!), let us know! And stay tuned for our next newsletter coming in September.

For any suggestions, examples, or complaints, email: nn@euobserver.com, esn@euobserver.com, alexander.fanta@ftm.nl, maggiore@investigate-europe.org, schumann@investigate-europe.eu, hansens@investigate-europe.org

Meet the Austrian businessman harnessing the far-right to cut Europe’s green laws

Lise Witteman — Tue, 14 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What’s the news?

Former EU lawmaker Paul Rübig, an Austrian entrepreneur with major clients in the oil and chemical industries, has spent 30 years building a powerful network within the Brussels bureaucracy.
The Austrian seems to be pursuing a specific agenda: championing the interests of companies like his own, accelerating free trade, pushing for deregulation, and vilifying troublesome NGOs.
Operating largely out of public scrutiny, he is part of a network of interest groups rooted in Bavaria. Together with European Christian Democrats and a strong US lobby, they are currently exerting significant influence on European decision-making. They are gaining momentum by playing into the rise of the far right.

Why does it matter?

Sustainability policies are currently being dismantled in Brussels at an unprecedented pace, while far-right parties are gaining increasing influence. This story sheds light on the underlying interests and the influential figures involved.

How was this investigated?

For this months-long investigation, FTM investigated the alignment of agendas of several stakeholder groups by comparing activities, narratives, and interests, to learn who key players are.
FTM reviewed public records and financial statements of Rübig and his companies.
Through an extensive review of publicly available material, FTM mapped Rübig’s network and the connections its members have.
FTM also spoke with several people who have worked with the Austrian.

“The best thing is always to ignore extremists. The more of a platform you give them, the more followers they will attract.”

When the Christian Democrat politician Paul Rübig decided to quit politics in 2019 after 23 years in the European Parliament, he reflected on his political career in the Austrian newspaper Die Presse.

He liked that there was no opposition in the Parliament, he said: because there are no clear majorities in the Parliament, EU lawmakers have to build consensus over what policies should look like across several parties.

Six years later, Rübig would use that exact need for consensus to his advantage to influence European decision-making from the outside. With his carefully built-up network, he has become one of the key players in an alliance between Bavarian Christian Democrats and the US lobby. The network wanted to dismantle sustainability legislation EU institutions had put forward – and were successful. Key to its success? Europe’s far right.

This is the story of an Austrian metalworker who, rather than ignoring extremists, uses a shift towards the right in the political landscape to push for his own interests.

‘That’s true love’

In the small Austrian provincial town of Wels, Franz Rübig, Paul’s grandfather, laid the foundations for a metalworking empire in 1946: the RÜBIG Group. It now generates an annual turnover of around €70 million and focuses on the development and manufacture of components for industrial equipment, machinery, and vehicles.
Paul was born in 1953. Now a slightly stocky man, usually dressed in a three-piece suit, people he’s worked with describe him as a reliable, helpful person who is a good networker.

“I said to her: ‘This is unacceptable … you need to take the initiative’ ”

Moving from military service to studying business administration, marketing and industrial engineering in Linz, he was giving skiing lessons to beginners in winter and flying classes during the summer, he later told a group of students.

In the late 1970s, his family’s company expanded to Germany, opening an office in Bavaria.

Fast-forward until the 1990s, and Paul Rübig took his first steps in politics, where he kept his focus on companies.

Paul (far left) and his brother Günter (far right), celebrate the company’s 50th anniversary.

As a member of the Austrian People's Party, he was pushing to abandon anything that could be seen as preventing companies in Europe from being able to do business freely: deregulation was, and has been, his credo.

In 1996, he was among the first group of Austrians to sit in the European Parliament on behalf of the largest political party: the Christian Democratic European People’s Party (EPP).

It’s there, about a decade later, that he’d make his first significant mark as a politician of international importance: fight against roaming charges within the European Union – high telephone charges when calling abroad.

Dubbed Mr Roaming, or Roaming Paul, he likes to tell the story in interviews and lectures of how he came to care about the subject: a student had come to him to complain about the high charges of several euros a minute when calling from abroad.

“Now, the really sad thing was that she’d just fallen in love… She was on the phone with her boyfriend in the hotel at night,” he told a group of students in 2014. “Time just flew by and the phone call lasted two hours. Two hours, at €3.60 per minute! I told her: ‘That’s true love’.”

That, he said, spurred him into action: he contacted the commissioner responsible for the matter at the time. “I said to her: ‘This is unacceptable … you need to take the initiative’,” he told the students. “It’s not in line with the single market.”

From left to right: Jonathan Evans, former MEP; Neelie Kroes, former European Commissioner in charge of competition; Martin Bartenstein,
former Austrian federal minister for economics and labour; Dr Paul Rübig, former MEP

The Commission embraced his call and put forward a proposal that would eventually lead to the end of roaming charges in Europe.

Throughout his life as both a politician and entrepreneur, it’s this message that he likes to repeat: he’s a man of the people, and, having been trained as a blacksmith before his studies, he can relate to the working class.

Speaking to the Austrian magazine Profil in 2011 about these various roles, he said: “The question is whether you want politicians who are purely engaged in politics, or politicians who also practise other professions. I think the latter makes sense, because then you can convey the day-to-day reality of politics.”

Rübig declined to respond to questions from Follow the Money. But in the only on-the-record response he sent after repeated requests, he emphasised his background as an advantage: “I am a trained blacksmith and my family business has given me the skills to produce goods for satisfied customers,” he said. “Through the start-ups I have set up, we have learnt just how difficult it is to succeed. As a member of the Rübig advisory board, I have shared my expertise with European institutions.”

“Even after his time as a politician, I saw him popping up in the European Parliament as if nothing had changed”

It’s Rübig’s apparent resourcefulness that Dieter-Michael Grohmann, a film director with whom he produced a documentary on one of Rübig’s other pet-topics – water safety – admires.

“As far as I’m concerned, he’s not a politician,” he told FTM. “He is, in the best sense of the word, an ‘entrepreneur’.”

“He sees opportunities, he sees demands. Take these roaming charges: he sees what we need in the world and he’s doing something to facilitate it.”

An industrial solution for cleaner water

Rübig has for years been advocating a European ‘Blue Deal’ to boost water technology, such as innovations that reduce industrial water consumption or can remove contaminants from water. He has sought to engage various bodies in this endeavour: the European Parliament, where he served until 2019; the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which he subsequently joined; and the SME Europe network, which he founded.

He also commissioned a documentary on water issues. According to co-producer Dieter-Michael Grohmann, it was financed partly by Rübig himself and partly by the industry. Regarding the documentary itself, Grohmann said that its approach was far less “ideological” than that of, for example, Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth. The documentary focuses primarily on the question of how to best respond to climate change.

In doing so he’s also pushed for measures that would mainly help his own business interests. For example, he championed investment in water treatment technology, a sector in which Rübig’s company Probig Handels GmbH operates, with, according to the website, major clients such as BP, Esso, ExxonMobil, Shell, Total, Bayer, DSM, Coca-Cola, and Daimler.

Sphere of influence

To advance his goals of cutting rules and red tape for the benefit of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Rübig relied on a close-knit group of people.

For this, his networking skills came in handy.

Elizabeth Kuiper, associate director of the think tank European Policy Centre (EPC) and active in the Brussels bubble since 2010, describes him as “a man who squeezes his way in everywhere”.

She’d meet him at meetings of the so-called Kangaroo Group in the European Parliament – a loose association of people working for European institutions, academics, media and businesses and designed to implement the internal market.

“You’d see him networking a lot, handing out business cards. He had branded himself as a sort of SME man,” she recalled. “Even after his time as a politician, I saw him popping up in the European Parliament as if nothing had changed.”

The new service branch of RUBIG Industrial Furnaces in Rockford, Illinois, in 2012.

In a similar vein, someone who had worked on the same team as Rübig wrote on LinkedIn that “Paul is a gifted networker who knows how to bring the right people together, both in terms of content and on a personal level”.

While in Parliament, Rübig set up various SME platforms. Through them, he brought together politicians and executives willing to champion the interests of companies such as his own: In 2001, for example, he created SME Global, a sub-division of the global centre-right political forum International Democracy Union. Some 10 years later, in 2012, he set up SME Europe, the official entrepreneurs’ wing of the EPP, an influential group of politicians that shapes the EPP’s industrial policy.

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And five years later, he founded the SME network SME Connect, an advocacy group for European SME interests.

“He is a very busy man,” someone who had worked with him later said on his LinkedIn page.

These platforms proved to be a crucial move: the three associations work together with the so-called European Economic Senate (EES), a Bavaria-based forum for politics and industry. The Taxpayers Association of Europe (TAE) is a partner organisation. It is a tangle of organisations with many shared activities and overlapping board members, located at shared addresses in Munich.

Throughout his decades in politics and after leaving Parliament, Rübig has heavily relied on this network of people hailing from Bavaria, and, as the future would show, it’s that same group that would move as one to push forward – or even breaking down – certain policies.

Free trade, deregulation, and campaigning against NGOs

Rübig didn’t only push for improving rules of businesses in Europe.

Between 2012 and 2016, the Austrian championed the transatlantic free trade agreement TTIP. At the heart of the negotiations was the removal of both trade tariffs and regulatory differences – for example, differing standards for food safety, the environment or labour legislation.

This was also in Rübig’s own interests: his family business opened a branch in Illinois, US, in 2012. The differing certification standards posed a real barrier for machine manufacturers such as the Rübigs.

The chemical and fossil fuel industries – in which many of Rübig’s clients operate – seized the opportunity by pushing hard for sweeping deregulation in Europe. Rübig sought to bring this agenda to the European Parliament.

For example, the Austrian had become vice-chair of ‘Red Tape Watch’ in 2014, a working group that aimed to drive forward deregulation.

It’s around that time that Rübig took the lead in attacking opponents of the TTIP. For example, he co-organised a hearing aimed at framing NGOs as being intransparant. Taking the aim at NGOs, he claimed that “in many cases, nobody really knows how they are funded”.

Years later, that message would be repeated by fellow EPP lawmaker Markus Pieper, who published an own-initiative report asking for greater scrutiny of NGOs that received funding from the Commission for environmental projects. Rübig and Pieper both have been board members of SME Europe and they worked together as part of a group to reduce red tape.

Drastic deregulation

That moment would arrive in 2024, at the end of Ursula von der Leyen’s first mandate as Commissioner President.

As part of her signature European Green Deal, von der Leyen’s cabinet had put forward a law – the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) – that would force companies to conduct due diligence in their supply chains.

In the spring of 2024, EU lawmakers adopted the rules.

It was a major setback for Rübig and his network, who had been advocating for loosening regulation for companies. This was especially true for small and medium sized ones that he believed didn’t have the capacity to implement all of the rules. Under CSDDD, companies in Europe can be held responsible for abuses in their supply chains.

Rübig, as always, would rise to the occasion.

The International Leaders Summit led by co-founders Natasha Srdoc and Joel Anand Samy in partnership with Chairman Manfred Weber and Chairman Mike Bost co-hosted the inaugural American-European Leaders Summit at the European Parliament on June 27, 2023.

Five years earlier, Rübig had decided not to run for office again: after 23 years, it was time to leave the European Parliament. He had moved to the European Economic and Social Committee, or EESC, a European advisory body for civil society. While the institution rarely attracts public attention, its formal role as an EU consultative body gives its members privileged access to policy makers and the legislative process.

Then, when the due diligence rules were adopted in 2024, he put forward the Swedish MEP Jörgen Warborn (EPP) to take over the chairmanship of SME Europe and SME Global.

Warborn, Weber and Max Primorac of the Heritage Foundation

Warborn, in turn, aligned with US allies to increase pressure to water down the due diligence rules.

Just after Trump was elected president for the second time, in late 2024, Warborn and EPP President Manfred Weber – who forged his career in Bavaria – were guests at the controversial but influential right-wing think tank, the Heritage Foundation.

An EPP spokesperson said this meeting was merely meant “to gain a better understanding of the political landscape ahead of the incoming Trump administration”.

Shortly after their visit, the Heritage Foundation – followed by the US government – reportedly characterised the due diligence rules as a serious problem.

About the right

The Heritage Foundation – and US lobby more broadly – wouldn’t be the only ones aligning with the deregulation agenda, in Brussels too the tides were turning: the European Parliament elections in June 2024 marked a pivotal moment in European politics.

For the first time, radical and far-right groups in the European Parliament became large enough to help the Christian Democrats secure the majorities needed to push against environmental policies that were seen as anti-business.

Faced with growing forces on the right, as well as with intensive lobbying by major oil firms and continuous pressure from the businesses and the Bavarian network close to Rübig, the new European Commission showed itself willing to cut red tape.

From within the EESC, Rübig produced an opinion – adopted by a large majority of its civil society members – on the proposed reduction in regulation.

Rübig himself would often refer to this opinion as being an important starting point for the CSDDD deregulation.

EPP head Weber nominated Rübig’s new SME chief, Warborn, to take on the role of a lead-lawmaker for a first revision of the CSDDD the Commission had proposed. This means that he is negotiating with the Commission and EU countries on the practical implementation of the revision on behalf of the Parliament.

Warborn carried out his duties in close contact with the US lobby, an investigation by French NGO BLOOM revealed.

The Swede also did not shy away from seeking alignment with the far right: Warborn pursued an agreement with the parties on the right, in an attempt to force the parties on the left to make concessions. “It is very clear to all the political groups that the majorities in Parliament have changed,” Warborn said at the time. “And all the political groups must adapt to the new reality.”

Warborn and Weber declined to comment. They previously rejected all allegations of a conflict of interest, the German weekly Der Spiegel reported.

Pushing ahead

Throughout the process, Rübig himself expressed great satisfaction with the work of his successor.

When BLOOM’s critical analysis was published, for example, Rübig offered words of encouragement to his successor. “Congratulations on your success in reducing bureaucracy!! The NGOs criticising you are themselves failing to be transparent.”

In November 2025, the Christian Democrats wrapped up the revision of the CSDDD with the parties on the right.

The new version scraps the EU-wide civil liability regime, meaning that companies can no longer be sued under the harmonised civil liability rules, with enforcement instead left primarily to national authorities, and any civil or criminal liability depending on national law. It also removes obligations for businesses to implement a climate transition plan, and reduces the number of EU companies subject to due diligence rules from around 13,000 to around 1,000.

The revision of the CSDDD didn’t only roll back sustainability provisions, it also marked the beginning of the EPP increasingly relying on the far right to push through policies.

Screenshot of Paul Rübig's website

That’s a dangerous development, said German political scientist Sophia Russack, from European think tank CEPS.

“The Christian Democrats are underestimating the tactics of the far right,” she said. “This is their chance to become more professional and secure increasingly better positions in the European Parliament.”

Immediately after the parliamentary vote, a jubilant statement followed from the White House: thanks to “a US pressure campaign”, the CSDDD has been curtailed, as reported on X.

It was a major success story for Rübig – and unlikely his last: “Work hard, strike precisely,” his personal motto goes.

Salsabil Fayed, Lisanne van Vucht, Anna Milovanovic, Alexander Fanta, Hans Wetzels and Charlotte Wirth contributed reporting.

Tesla puts Singapore back on the Netherlands’ tax radar

Henk Willem Smits, Lise Witteman, Simon Van Dorpe — Mon, 13 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Welcome back to Bureau Brussels – your weekly deep dive into the power plays, backroom deals, and investigations shaping life for millions of people across the bloc.

What’s in store this week?

Tesla’s tax structure puts Singapore back on the Dutch radar
EU prosecutors won’t pursue a high-profile complaint over NGO funding
Tensions rise as Parliament refuses to lift another MEP’s immunity

STORY OF THE WEEK

Tesla puts Singapore back on the Netherlands’ tax radar

In Brussels, European Commission officials and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have long questioned whether large companies are using Singapore to reduce their tax bills.

Since the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) agreed on a minimum 15% corporate tax rate for multinationals, Singapore has been on the Parliament’s radar. The Commission has also looked into whether the city-state belongs on a grey list or black list over its tax regime.

The Dutch government has launched an investigation into Singapore’s tax rules following parliamentary questions about the corporate structure of a major company. Although it is not named, the context makes clear it is US carmaker Tesla, whose European headquarters are in Amsterdam.

Last year, we reported on Tesla’s reorganisation of corporate entities between the Netherlands, Singapore, and Switzerland. After anti-abuse rules introduced in 2020 meant the tax structure Tesla had used in the Netherlands no longer worked, the company inserted a Singaporean entity between its Dutch headquarters and its US parent company to avoid paying more tax.

According to Reuters, Tesla channelled about $18 billion (€15.4 billion) in untaxed profits through the Netherlands and Singapore.

Tesla has since reshuffled its structure again. Since 2025, its Dutch entities have been owned by a Swiss company. Exactly why isn’t clear. Tesla previously declined to comment on questions about the change.

According to Jan Vleggeert, professor of tax law at Leiden University, the Dutch investigation shouldn’t stop at Singapore. It should also look at Switzerland, and potentially other countries with tax regimes that are favourable to large companies.

Henk Willem Smits

Other news from the EU bubble

EU prosecutors find “no grounds” for complaint on NGO funding

Last year, a taxpayers’ rights lobby group asked the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to investigate the funding practices of former European Commissioners Frans Timmermans and Virginijus Sinkevičius. The complaint formed part of a broader campaign against EU funding for NGOs. We asked EPPO whether it had taken any action on this remarkable case. The office said the complaint challenged “an entire area of European policy”, covering thousands of grants awarded to NGOs under the LIFE Programme and other EU environmental funding schemes. It ultimately found no grounds to open a criminal investigation and said it had “not identified any element” to substantiate suspicions of criminal wrongdoing. There’s more to this story. We’ll publish it later this week.

Lise Witteman

Parliament refuses to lift immunity of yet another MEP

The European Parliament on Tuesday refused to lift the immunity of Bulgarian MEP Ilhan Kyuchyuk (Renew Europe) following a recommendation by its legal affairs committee, which he chairs. Kyuchyuk was accused of using Parliament funds to support his national party. Parliament argued the case amounted to political persecution after the EPPO suspended the investigation’s lead prosecutor for “serious political misconduct”. The vote is likely to deepen tensions between Parliament and prosecutors, who have criticised Parliament for increasingly interfering in ongoing investigations. It also gives the EPPO another chance to challenge the decision before the EU’s General Court in Luxembourg.

Simon Van Dorpe

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What impact will this have on our atmosphere? And are there rules in place to protect it?

Read the full story

Podcast | PayPal and the business of hate

Far-right groups in Europe are using PayPal to sell merchandise and raise money, despite a ban on transactions that promote hate or discrimination. This highlights a broader failure by Big Tech, which is not just turning a blind eye but allowing extremist content to remain on its platforms.

Listen to the podcast

The EU says IT problems have delayed its deforestation law. Critics believe lobbying is to blame.

The EU wanted to save the world’s forests. But then it claimed its IT system got in the way.

The Commission delayed its landmark deforestation law because of technical problems. But documents obtained by FTM show Brussels had known about those issues for years without fixing them. Was it really an IT failure, or did lobbying and political pressure also play a role?

Read the article

Space races, forest failures & toxic profits

Eve Moore — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Dear readers,

This week, we looked into the potential environmental cost of the race between Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos to dominate space. We also probed the European Commission’s claim that IT issues caused repeated delays to its flagship deforestation law, or whether lobbying and political pressure also played a role.

Our latest podcast, meanwhile, explored how far-right groups across Europe continue to use PayPal to raise money and sell merchandise, despite the company’s own rules against promoting hate.

Elsewhere, our partners revealed how a wanted Turkish businessman promoted gambling sites without the required licence, while another investigation exposed weak oversight of industrial pig farm pollution in Romania and Hungary.

Here’s your weekly investigative briefing.

From us:

Musk and Bezos want to transform space. But at what cost?

What impact will this have on our atmosphere? And are there rules in place to protect it?

Podcast | PayPal and the business of hate

Far-right groups in Europe are using PayPal to sell merchandise and raise money, despite a ban on transactions that promote hate or discrimination. In our latest podcast, Polina Bachlakova from The Fuller Project explained how this points to a broader failure by Big Tech, which is not just turning a blind eye but allowing extremist content to remain on its platforms.

Listen to the podcast and watch this short video below where FTM’s Frank Meijer breaks down the story

The EU says IT problems have delayed its deforestation law. Critics believe lobbying is to blame.

The EU wanted to save the world’s forests. It just couldn’t get its own IT to work.

The Commission delayed its rules on deforestation because of technical problems. But documents obtained by FTM show Brussels had known about those issues for years without fixing them. Was it really an IT failure, or did lobbying and political pressure also play a role?

Read the article

From friends of FTM:

Wanted Turkish gambler faces scrutiny in Europe

A cross-border OCCRP investigation revealed that a Polish company ultimately owned by a wanted Turkish businessman promoted gambling sites without the required licence. The company has reportedly been linked to betting platforms that repeatedly evaded Turkish bans by switching web domains. The man, Fedlan Kılıçaslan, is wanted by Turkish authorities over alleged illegal betting operations. His company denies wrongdoing.

Why pig farm pollution goes unchecked

Context.ro and Átlátszó found official evidence linking intensive pig farming to polluted groundwater, yet enforcement was limited. Authorities merely verify the paperwork of pollution samples that industrial pig farms in Romania and Hungary have collected themselves; the farms also pay laboratories that analyse them. Hungary issued just one €700 fine in five years, while Romanian officials attributed fish deaths near a major slaughterhouse to natural causes. The investigation raises concerns about whether environmental watchdogs are doing enough to independently verify pollution.

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Until next week

Next week, we’ll bring you more investigations, podcasts and newsletters, including the final Secrecy Tracker before the summer break and a new Crime & Corruption edition. Stay tuned.

Got feedback, tips, or story ideas? Get in touch at info@ftm.nl

Musk and Bezos want to transform space. But at what cost?

Dimitri Tokmetzis — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What’s the news?

SpaceX wants to launch a million data centres into space. With its recent blockbuster IPO, Elon Musk’s company has moved a step closer to realising this ambition.
Other space giants – such as Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin – are also planning vast constellations of data centres and communications satellites. In total, 1.5 million satellites could be launched over the next 15 years, Follow the Money calculated.

Why does this matter?

Scientists are increasingly worried. Rocket launches and satellites are already creating environmental risks. Harmful substances are being released into the atmosphere with far-reaching consequences including ozone layer depletion.
Governance is struggling to keep pace with this new space race. Outer space is a global commons, meaning no country or company owns it outright. In practice, this has created a first-come, first-served approach – allowing companies to secure orbital positions faster than international rules can be developed.

How was this investigated?

FTM analysed satellite applications submitted by companies to national and international regulators.
We interviewed astronomers and experts in the field of space policy about the latest scientific insights into debris and environmental impacts.

When the last of the winter snow finally melted in April 2024, farmer Barry Sawchuk made an unexpected discovery: a few metres of debris scattered across his field in northern Canada.

With nothing but wilderness stretching for miles in every direction around his land in Saskatchewan province, the farmer suspected that the fragments had fallen from space.

The story was covered in the local media and soon caught the attention of Samantha Lawler, an astrophysicist at the nearby University of Regina. She began investigating and concluded that the debris must have come from a SpaceX Crew Dragon craft.

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The Dragon’s crew capsule had splashed down safely at sea on 9 February, but the section carrying cargo had not burnt up properly during re-entry, instead landing on Sawchuk’s farm.

It is relatively rare for debris from rockets and satellites to fall back to Earth intact. Usually, objects burn up in the atmosphere, disintegrating long before they can reach the ground.

That may seem like a convenient outcome, but it is actually a fast-growing problem – raising alarm among space researchers.

The burning process releases harmful substances into the upper layers of the atmosphere – a region that protects the Earth from radiation and also helps regulate the climate.

Spacecraft launches and re-entries are an “uncontrolled experiment in geoengineering”, according to Eloise Marais, professor of atmospheric chemistry at University College London.

It’s uncontrolled because the leading regulatory bodies are not monitoring the environmental impacts, nor do they currently have the capacity to do so.

Yet the scale of activity is set to skyrocket.

Research by Follow the Money reveals that companies from Elon Musk’s SpaceX to Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin have submitted plans for 1.5 million satellites over the next 15 years. That is almost 100 times the number currently in orbit.

Scientists doubt that so many satellites will be launched in the near future.

However, even a fraction of that figure would significantly increase atmospheric pollution.

The question is not just how serious the impact could become, but who is responsible – and whether there is any authority or power that could intervene.

Commercial space race

A new space race is underway, led by SpaceX and driven by competition with Bezos’ Blue Origin and Chinese interests.

Until recently, the aim was to launch as many communications satellites into orbit as quickly as possible.

SpaceX already operates around 10,000 Starlink satellites, with plans to expand to at least 42,000. Blue Origin is developing a constellation of more than 8,000 satellites. In China, the Radio Innovation Institute has announced plans for networks that could reach as many as 203,000 satellites.

This year, however, the competition has moved into a new phase: space-based data centres.

In January, SpaceX asked the US regulator – the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) – to waive various rules for a constellation of 1 million data center satellites. The company's blockbuster IPO in mid-June was intended, in part, to finance that ambition.

Musk paints orbital data centres as a greener alternative to the energy- and water-intensive facilities on Earth. After all, in space, there is abundant sunlight and natural cooling.

Bezos’ Blue Origin immediately opposed the proposal, citing environmental risks and impacts on astronomy. The company also said it feared an international backlash, arguing that regulators in other countries would object to the “monopolisation of orbital resources”.

Yet just two weeks later, Blue Origin filed its own proposal for more than 50,000 orbital data centres under the name Project Sunrise. Other US companies are also advancing similar plans, including Starcloud with about 88,000 orbital data centres, Cowboy Space Corp with 20,000, and Google, which has signalled interest but has not disclosed any figures.

In China, several companies – such as Zhejiang Laboratory’s Three-Body Computing Constellation – have already placed data centres in low Earth orbit that exchange data via laser communication. In April, the Chinese start-up Beijing Orbital Twilight Technology secured a loan of €7.4 billion for a fleet of data centres.

Europe, by contrast, is trailing in the broader race for space infrastructure.

The EU’s IRIS² programme – designed to reduce dependence on Starlink – has fewer than 300 satellites. A study has also explored the possibility of European data centres in space.

SpaceX and Blue Origins did not respond to FTM’s requests for comment.

Toxic waste

The satellite boom relies on a constant turnover of hardware in orbit. Most satellites have a lifespan of around five years.

Once they reach the end of their operational life, some are moved into a so-called “graveyard orbit” – a higher, more remote region of space where they are less likely to collide with other spacecraft or debris. More commonly, they are sent back into the atmosphere, where they burn up during re-entry.

The process of launching satellites – which could potentially be dozens of times a day if current expansion plans go ahead – and their eventual destruction in the atmosphere releases various harmful substances.

During launch, rockets emit different pollutants depending on the fuel used: soot particles and nitrogen oxides from kerosene-based fuels, as well as chlorine compounds and alumina from solid propellants.

Re-entry creates another source of pollution, releasing metals and metal oxides from satellites – substances that don’t naturally occur in the upper atmosphere.

The main concern is soot. These dark particles absorb sunlight efficiently, trapping heat and warming the surrounding atmosphere. Earth-based sources such as shipping, coal-fired power stations, and heavy-duty vehicles emit more soot than rockets.

However, emissions from rockets are released directly into the upper atmosphere, where they can remain for years rather than the weeks typical of soot closer to the Earth’s surface.

At such high altitudes, their climate impact is estimated to be 400 to 500 times greater, according to research by Marais of University College London and other academics.

The consequences are complex. Marais said soot particles initially warm the atmosphere before producing a cooling effect later on.

While that may sound reassuring, the professor warned that this phenomenon isn’t well understood yet – leaving uncertainty about the long-term consequences.

Lack of scrutiny

What’s more, nitrogen oxides, chlorine compounds and alumina contribute to the depletion of the ozone layer. Since the late 1980s, international cooperation has helped put the ozone layer on a path to recovery.

But in 2022, Marais’s research under review estimated that rocket launches and the re-entry of satellites, rockets, and space debris had already undone around 10% of that progress.

The full scale of the problem is currently uncertain. In 2023, other scientists found that a tenth of particles sampled in the stratosphere contained traces of metals that could only have come from burnt-up satellites and rocket components.

It’s all secret and the companies are not sharing anything

Astrophysicist Lawler said that a constellation of 1 million satellites – as proposed by Musk’s SpaceX – would mean, on average, a satellite burning up in the atmosphere every three minutes.

“And these are two-tonne satellites – they’re not exactly small. It’s ridiculous,” she added.

Lawler argued that satellite manufacturers should face the same kind of scrutiny as car manufacturers.

“If they’re burning up this many satellites, it should be more like car crash testing, right? It’s like you have to submit a few cars for crash testing,” she said.

“We should be able to find out what’s being emitted, how many pieces might survive to hit the ground.”

“But it’s all secret and the companies are not sharing anything.”

Such tests don’t exist. They have never been made mandatory because existing governance was not designed for the era of mega-constellations and a space race driven by billionaires.

First come, first served

Space belongs to everyone – it’s a shared resource. That’s the principle, at least, of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, signed by all large space faring nations.

In principle, this means no country or company can claim ownership over any part of space. But in practice, this has created a first-come, first-served type of system.

There is, however, one important check. The main regulatory body is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which manages the global radio frequency spectrum.

Before a satellite can operate in orbit, arrangements must be made to ensure that a suitable frequency is available for it to communicate with ground stations. Like space itself, the radio spectrum is a limited resource.

Attempts to update international regulations and governance on the use of space are proving very tricky, according to Ian Christensen of the Secure World Foundation, an organisation focused on the sustainable use of space.

“The biggest challenges I see are that the pace of innovation in industry cannot be matched by the rather slow pace of regulatory and policy development,” he told FTM.

Speeding up that process is complicated by what Christensen diplomatically calls “the current geopolitical challenges”, making it difficult for countries to make binding agreements.

To compound matters, Aaron Boley, a space researcher at the University of British Columbia, said that companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin are also adept at circumventing existing rules, such as those set by the ITU.

‘Consequences are happening now’

Boley also believes that current legislation fails to properly address environmental concerns.

Fragmented governance has created loopholes that allow companies to sidestep scrutiny, particularly over the impacts of launches on the upper atmosphere, according to Boley.

The main route to reform runs through expert groups at the ITU and the United Nations.

The most worrying thing is that nobody knows what to do, right?

At the same time, scientific organisations and individual researchers are pushing for stronger governance through appeal procedures.

A connection has not yet been established between space sustainability and the much broader environmental movement on Earth.

Boley said he has tried to build links with organisations working on climate change, but struggled to gain traction.

“When we reached out to them, they were just like: ‘Oh, God, not another thing that could affect the climate.’ So, you know, they’re feeling that sort of pressure,” he explained.

“Many [organisations] still view outer space as separate from Earth’s environment, which is one of the biggest issues that I think we all need to tackle together,” Boley added. “Earth and space are actually intricately connected.”

According to Maarten de Zeeuw, programme strategist at Greenpeace, space is not a major focus for most environmental groups, although he sees attitudes slowly beginning to change.

“Since Musk’s announcement about the data centres, our concerns have certainly grown,” he told FTM. “It is essential that legislation is introduced to address the energy and water consumption and emissions associated with data centres, both on Earth and in space.”

In the meantime, and a world away from such policy concerns, farmers like Sawchuk are left to deal with the debris from billionaires’ space ambitions.

It was only after Lawler – the astrophysicist – alerted the local, regional, and national press that two employees from Musk’s Space X arrived to collect the debris from his land.

According to Lawler’s account, they declined to comment when they arrived. Sawchuk received a small amount of compensation for the damage caused. The debris was loaded into a removal van and taken away – its final destination unknown.

“The most worrying thing is that nobody knows what to do, right?” Lawler said.

“We’re entering this era where there’s so much debris in orbit … and governments aren’t ready. Regulation is decades behind where it should be,” she added.

“But the consequences are real and happening now.”

Podcast | PayPal and the business of hate

Emma du Chatinier, Polina Bachlakova — Wed, 08 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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The EU says IT problems have delayed its deforestation law. Critics believe lobbying is to blame

Hans Wetzels — Tue, 07 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

This article in 1 minute

What’s the news?

In late 2025, the European Commission once again postponed the implementation of the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). The official reason was significant problems with the IT system underpinning the legislation.
Documents seen by FTM show that the Commission had been aware of these IT issues for years – yet took no action to resolve them.
Businesses and EU lawmakers are questioning whether this alone justified yet another delay to the legislation.
Criticism of the EUDR from trading partners such as the US and Indonesia has fuelled concerns that the Commission postponed the law because it had become too politically sensitive. In addition, several EU member states sought to secure exemptions from the rules in order to protect their domestic timber sectors.

Why does this matter?

Under the law, large companies importing cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, soya, timber, and beef must be able to prove that their products are deforestation-free by 30 December 2026. For smaller firms, the deadline is 30 June 2027.
However, there is a great deal of uncertainty within the business community over how the rules will be enforced, who will be held liable for compliance failures, and whether the Commission’s IT system will actually work when the law takes effect.
Companies are expected to have to invest millions of euros to adapt and monitor their supply chains to meet the new requirements. The repeated postponements have created additional costs and uncertainty for firms preparing for the law.

How was this investigated?

FTM obtained correspondence showing that companies have been warning Brussels about IT problems since December 2023. Internal Commission documents, memos, and a letter to a major lobbying organisation paint a picture of an institution that appears increasingly uncertain.
To understand the broader context, FTM interviewed companies, members of the European Parliament (MEPs), a software expert, and lobbying groups.
FTM also put questions to Indonesia’s chief trade negotiator – who led talks on a major free-trade agreement with the EU – to establish if the deforestation law featured in those negotiations.

This article is part of an ongoing series.

The EU Files

The vast warehouse where Tamara Tanghe works in the port of Antwerp is packed to the rafters with sacks of coffee and cocoa. The air is cool and sweet, carrying a faint trace of the tropics.

These beans are imported from tropical countries including Brazil, Ivory Coast, and Peru – places where deforestation remains a significant and persistent problem.

That has become a pressing issue for the European Union, and a practical headache for Tanghe. She is joint managing director at a big international warehousing and logistics company that operates in the Belgian port city.

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For years, she has been preparing for the implementation of the EU’s landmark anti-deforestation law (EUDR), which will require importers to prove that commodities such as coffee, beef, and soya were not linked to forest destruction or degradation.

The world-first legislation was approved by the European Parliament with a huge majority of 86% in April 2023, and was originally due to apply from December 2024.

As a major importer of high-risk crops such as coffee, cocoa, and soya used for animal feed, the EU hoped to use its market power to curb deforestation worldwide.

A plot of land cleared for palm oil plantantions in Borneo, Indonesia.

To meet the new obligations, big European companies began investing heavily to make their supply chains deforestation-free.

Outside the EU, however, the regulation quickly faced resistance from key trading partners, including Indonesia and the United States.

Much to Tanghe’s surprise, the European Commission gave in to political pressure. The law has been weakened and delayed twice: it will now not come into effect until this December.

“It’s ludicrous that we still don’t know where we stand”

Brussels blamed the delays on technical problems with the IT system that companies would use to upload millions of GPS coordinates tracking the origin of their goods.

However, an investigation by Follow the Money suggests that the Commission knew about these issues for years – but did nothing to address them.

Affected companies and members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have questioned if the IT problems really justify the delays, or whether they are being used as a smokescreen amid pressure from some industry players and trading partners.

In the meantime, supply chain professionals such as Tanghe are left in limbo.

“It’s ludicrous that we still don’t know where we stand,” she told FTM in May.

“I keep getting questions from all kinds of people about documents with product data. But how we’ll have to process these, we don’t know, and it is completely unclear who will be blamed if a form is missing,” Tanghe added.

Complex supply chains

On the quayside in Antwerp, shipping containers from around the world are stacked sky-high. According to Tanghe, determining the exact origin of goods from coffee to palm oil – and whether forests were cleared to produce them – is very complicated.

Her company handles the storage and customs clearance of large consignments of cocoa, coffee, and sugar for international food traders. To comply with the EU’s new deforestation rules, a lengthy chain of procedures is required.

First, the precise location of cocoa farms in Ghana or Ivory Coast must be mapped using GPS coordinates and satellite imagery. Local authorities then have to verify – through land registry records or on-site inspections – that no illegal deforestation has taken place at that specific site.

A former tropical rainforest, cleared for oil palm plantations, in Sumatra, Indonesia.

Such traders play a central role in the global food system and are responsible for ensuring that shipments to the EU carry the documentation needed to prove that their cargo has not contributed to deforestation.

When the goods arrive in Antwerp, the information is passed on to Tanghe’s staff, who will then be required to upload it to the EU’s dedicated IT platform – once the system is fully operational.

Meeting these requirements can require millions of euros in investment from companies operating within supply chains for high-risk commodities, according to Tanghe. The Commission’s years of delays and successive postponements of the EUDR has imposed significant costs on the business community, she explained.

“We just hired an extra member of staff to handle the new deforestation rules,” Tanghe said. “The Commission itself, on the other hand, has not even organised a training session to explain exactly how the IT system works.”

Unsuitable IT system

The EUDR will apply to companies operating in seven high-risk commodity categories: cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, soya, wood, and beef products.

Once the law comes into force, millions of data points will have to be stored digitally to verify that imports into the EU from these sectors are deforestation-free.

To manage this, the Commission intends to use its existing IT platform – TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System). That system is already being used to host certification data for biological farm produce – a sector much smaller in size.

They’re asking us to invest millions in transparent supply chains

However, letters seen by FTM reveal that the largest food lobby groups have warned the Commission since December 2023 that TRACES is unsuitable for handling the volume of data that will need to be processed under the new law.

Calls by companies for the IT system to be stress-tested were ignored by the Commission for years, said a corporate lobbyist speaking on condition of anonymity.

“Setting up a stress test isn’t particularly difficult. You simply tell a number of companies that they need to log into the system at an agreed time on a specific day and start using it as they normally would on a busy day. That simply never happened,” the person said.

“Yet the Commission has to be aware of the fact that this system is not very suitable if you need to store millions of data points.”

The EU Files

What is transpiring within the European Union? What are the goals and aspirations of the EU, and how is the budget allocated?

According to Clément Collignon, whose French supply chain data firm Sustaain has extensive experience with large-scale software systems, the problem with TRACES is that it’s “a legacy system that was used historically to manage food and quality testing”.

“My whole theory is that it doesn’t make sense to postpone, because technically these problems can be solved,” Collignon said.

“If you really want to fix the bugs you need the system operational, not delayed.”

Some members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have also sent warnings to the Commission about issues with the IT system.

Dutch MEP Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy – who represents the liberal Renew group in the Parliament's Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) – has followed the issue for years, and said he doesn’t believe the narrative from Brussels.

“Apparently, it was very convenient to exaggerate these so-called IT problems rather than solve them,” he told FTM.

The ‘13th floor’ in Brussels

Originally, the EUDR was due to enter into force on 30 December 2024. A few months before that date, the Commission unexpectedly announced a one-year postponement of the law, citing a lack of readiness among several international trading partners.

What’s more, a supporting document setting out practical guidance for companies – drawn up by the Commission’s environment department, DG ENV – had not been completed, according to EU chief Ursula von der Leyen.

However, several people with knowledge of the matter told FTM that the guidance had in fact been ready for some time yet was gathering dust on von der Leyen’s desk on the 13th floor of the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels.

One of those individuals described the “13th floor” as a delaying tactic regularly used for politically sensitive files.

Gerbrandy – the Dutch MEP – believes the same dynamics were in play with the delay of the EUDR.

“This happened just before the EU elections,” he said. “To me that suggests broader political interests were at play behind the scenes.”

Reputational risk

As in the business community, there is considerable confusion in the Parliament about the Commission’s erratic approach. Several MEPs have questioned Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall about what she is doing to address the issue.

“She failed to explain clearly exactly what those IT problems actually were and where they came from,” Gerbrandy said. “This is a source of great frustration for me and many of my colleagues. After all, we passed this law quite some time ago already.”

To find out more about the cause of the delays to the EUDR, the Parliament requested internal documents from the Commission earlier this year.

A site being cleared for a palm oil plantation in Aceh, Indonesia.

In a memo marked “sensitive” – which was seen by FTM – a senior official wrote that the Commission received new information in July 2025 indicating that the expected burden on the software system would lead to the “complete collapse” of IT services – resulting in “serious reputational damage” for the institution.

It remains unclear who provided the new information cited in the memo. The name has been redacted, and the Commission refused to disclose it when asked by FTM.

According to leaked internal information, Commission officials internally justified the decision to postpone the EUDR until December 2026 with information reportedly provided by Ikea.

The Swedish furniture giant imports large quantities of wood and, according to officials, would have needed to upload at least 18 million GPS data points within two months – significantly more than had been anticipated.

For that reason, the Commission’s legal service concluded that postponing the legislation once again was the “only option”.

Ikea told FTM that the cited figure of 18 million was “highly unrealistic” and distanced itself in the strongest possible terms from the Commission’s decision-making process.

“We have no indication that any Ikea submissions, whether in scale or timing, have been a determining factor in the European Commission’s decision to postpone the regulation,” a spokesperson said.

Pushback at home and abroad

Despite growing consternation within the EU, the Commission continued to insist to the outside world that everything was in order.

In August 2025 – mere weeks after the internal memo about the risk of a complete collapse – the Commission sent a letter to the industry association Fediol describing the IT system as “robust”.

However, just a month later, Commissioner Roswall suddenly announced that the EUDR would have to be postponed – again – until the end of 2026, citing IT problems.

The Commission did not respond by deadline to a follow-up question from FTM asking how its public assurances of a “robust” system could be reconciled with its internal warnings of systemic failure and the eventual postponement of the legislation.

A palm oil plantation in Malaysian Borneo.

The corporate lobbyist expressed disbelief at the ongoing confusion.

“They’re asking us to invest millions of euros in transparent supply chains,” the individual said. “All the Commission had to do was set up a decent IT system. To be honest, I find it extremely embarrassing that they haven’t even managed to do that.”

Gerbrandy went even further, voicing his anger at the Commission’s handling of a piece of legislation that was once once seen as crucial to achieve the EU’s climate goals.

“If it turns out that the deforestation regulation has been postponed under the false pretence of an IT problem, the Commission has a problem,” he said.

“In that case, the Parliament has been lied to and, as far as I am concerned, that would constitute a serious breach of trust.”

The exact motives behind the Commission’s approach remain a matter of speculation.

However, several EU member states are known to be unenthusiastic about the law and have pushed for exemptions to protect their own forestry sectors and timber exports.

In a leaked exchange of letters in 2025, von der Leyen personally promised German Chancellor Friedrich Merz that she would water down requirements for timber produced within the EU.

In May, following intense lobbying from Italy, the European leather industry also secured its own exemption from the rules. The timing of Roswall’s announcement to once again postpone the deforestation rules also raised eyebrows.

It came on 23 September, just hours after the EU unveiled a major trade agreement with Indonesia – the world’s largest palm oil exporter and a vocal critic of the EUDR.

“The EUDR touches upon many economic interests”

A month earlier, the Commission had issued a statement on the bloc’s much criticised trade deal with the United States in which it committed to addressing “the concerns of US producers and exporters regarding the EU Deforestation Regulation”.

Even after Roswall’s announcement, a delegation of US officials toured European capitals in early March to lobby against the EUDR entering into force at all, according to reporting by Euractiv.

“The EUDR touches upon many economic interests,” said Nicole Polsterer, a campaigner at the environmental NGO Fern.

“Different industries, most notably the forestry sector in Germany, have pushed back heavily. And we all know that the US administration has been very vocal about this to protect their agricultural sector,” she added. “But proving what in the end was most important for the Commission is really hard to substantiate.”

‘Get a move on’

When asked by FTM, a Commission spokesperson said that the postponement of the legislation has nothing to do with demands from international trading partners.

According to the Commission, there is no record of the new deforestation rules being discussed in recent trade negotiations with Indonesia.

However, Indonesia’s economic affairs minister told an audience of businesspeople in Jakarta in November that diplomatic efforts led by his country had paid off by securing a further delay to the EUDR.

Djatmiko Bris Witjaksono, director general of international trade negotiations at Indonesia’s trade ministry, confirmed that such pressure had indeed been applied.

“We tried to exert influence in member states such as Germany because they held a different view to Brussels,” he told FTM by phone from Jakarta.

“We have also been very outspoken about this in our contacts with the Commission. And I happen to know that the EU negotiator teams themselves were also very uncomfortable with the EUDR because it made their own work much more difficult.”

Back at the port of Antwerp, logistics director Tanghe remains dismayed by the political wrangling in Brussels. She hopes that the Commission will stand its ground this time, and ensure the new legislation is actually implemented by the end of 2026.

“To be honest, for a long time I thought this whole bill would simply be scrapped because the Commission had made such a mess of it,” Tanghe said.

“If we want to be up and running by December, the Commission really needs to get a move on. It’s June now, and those IT problems really must be sorted out before the end of the year,” she concluded, before disappearing among the bales of coffee in her bright yellow high-vis vest.

EU research funds to Israel halved in 2025

Jesse Pinster, Emma du Chatinier, Lise Witteman, Alexander Fanta — Mon, 06 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Welcome back to Bureau Brussels – your weekly deep dive into the power plays, backroom deals, and investigations shaping life for millions of people across the bloc.

What’s in store this week?

Israel’s EU research funding cut by half
Why is the “simplified” supply chain law still so complex?
Europe’s transparency promises meet Big Tech lobbying

STORY OF THE WEEK

EU research funds to Israel halved in 2025

Israeli companies, universities, and research institutes received €106 million from the EU’s research fund Horizon Europe last year, according to the recently updated Financial Transparency System. That’s a 50% drop from 2024, when Israeli participants secured €209 million.

The funding has become increasingly controversial amid Israel’s wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. Critics argue that EU-funded research could indirectly benefit Israel’s defence sector.

With a budget of €95.5 billion, Horizon Europe funds collaborative projects between universities, research institutes, and companies across the continent and partner countries.

The European Commission proposed partially suspending Israel’s participation in July 2025, but member states have yet to approve the measure. “The proposal is currently being discussed in the Council [of the European Union],” said the Commission. We contacted the Irish presidency, which took over the Council’s rotating chair last week, to ask whether it plans to put the issue on the agenda during its six-month term. It didn’t respond to our request for comment.

A Commission spokesperson confirmed earlier this year that Israeli “entities continue participating in the programme without restrictions”.

When it came to collaboration with Russian universities, Brussels took a different approach. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Commission suspended Horizon Europe payments to Russian organisations under the programme’s ethical and human rights clauses. It didn’t wait for member states to agree on broader sanctions.

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A European Citizens’ Initiative has also called for Israel’s full suspension from the programme. “EU citizens cannot tolerate that the EU maintains an agreement that contributes to legitimis[ing] and financ[ing] a State that commits crimes against humanity and war crimes.” As of 2 July, the proposal had received 1,243,834 signatories. Europeans can sign it until 15 July.

Among the institutions affected is Technion, a public research university in the Israeli city of Haifa. It received €21.5 million from Horizon Europe in 2024. Last year, that figure fell to €8.4 million.

The universities of Ghent in Belgium and Eindhoven in the Netherlands have explicitly stated that they no longer wish to work with Technion.

When Eindhoven University of Technology froze its cooperation with Technion last year, its president Koen Janssen was unequivocal. “The strong ties of Technion with the Israeli defence sector are indisputable,” he said.

Political criticism has been equally sharp. Two far-left members of the European Parliament (MEPs) described Technion as a “pillar of Israel’s military strategy”. Meanwhile, the Danish group Academics for Palestine argued that Israeli universities like Technion play “a key role in planning, implementing, and justifying Israel’s regime of occupation and apartheid”.

Another factor that may have contributed to the decline in funding for Israeli institutions is the return of the UK and Switzerland as associated countries in 2024 and 2025 respectively, which increased competition for grants.

In 2025, the UK received €789 million, compared with €284 million in 2024, while Switzerland got €903 million.

Jesse Pinster and Emma du Chatinier

So, is the supply chain law really STILL too complex?

Last year, the EU’s supply chain law (CSDDD) was significantly watered down through the Omnibus package. The Commission presented the changes as a “simplification” effort aimed at reducing the burden on businesses, particularly SMEs. Yet somehow the Dutch, German, and Swedish governments still deem it “crucial” for the Commission to clarify how the law fits with other EU rules, to “avoid overburdening companies”. In response to FTM, the Commission said the Omnibus changes “help streamline and simplify the due diligence process” and that it is “in close contact with all Member States to support their transposition efforts”. But if obvious fixes, such as aligning definitions and objectives across different pieces of legislation, were never addressed, what exactly has been simplified? We’ll have the answer soon.
Lise Witteman

The Commission’s shallow transparency on tech lobbying

The EU says it wants transparency around lobbying. Since January 2025, the Commission has published records of lobby meetings online. This flagship transparency commitment, however, falls woefully short in practice. Over the past 18 months, senior officials have held more than 100 meetings with tech companies about “technological sovereignty” – the EU capital’s buzzword for plans to reduce the bloc’s dependence on US infrastructure. Yet many of the records reveal virtually nothing regarding discussions. Take Google. Two meetings with the tech giant state that “sovereignty” was on the agenda, yet the conclusion simply reads “N/A”. Equally opaque, the notes from a Microsoft meeting mention the company’s “willingness to play a positive role” in European digital markets. But what does this actually mean? For a “transparent” disclosure system, it leaves a surprising amount of guesswork.

Alexander Fanta

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More than 40% of judges and advocates general hold shares or other interests in industries including pharmaceuticals, energy, and finance. In several cases, those interests directly overlapped with the work they were doing on the bench.

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Far-right groups rely on PayPal to spread extremism

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Némésis is far from alone. Fuller identified several far-right groups across Europe using PayPal to sell merchandise or collect donations, exposing gaps in the company’s enforcement of its own anti-hate policies. Former employees also warn that plans for greater reliance on AI could make those failures even harder to tackle.

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Hate merch, toxic trade & armed waters

Eve Moore — Sat, 04 Jul 2026 04:00:00 GMT

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Dear readers,

This week, our reporting took us from extremist fundraising efforts to the EU’s top court and the increasingly tense waters of the Baltic Sea.

We revealed how far-right groups across Europe continue to use PayPal to sell merchandise despite the company’s anti-extremism policies. Our investigation into the EU Court of Justice uncovered financial ties between judges and the industries they oversee. Meanwhile, our latest podcast explored Europe’s growing investment in Palantir, despite governments becoming more cautious about the controversial US tech firm.

We published the first public images of a heavily armed Russian gas tanker sailing through the Baltic Sea, offering a rare glimpse into the growing tensions surrounding Russia’s shadow fleet.

Elsewhere, our partners exposed how a suicide forum linked to Irish deaths remains accessible in Ireland despite being blocked in the UK. Another investigation revealed how Europe’s chemical industry has helped stall efforts to ban the export of toxic pesticides.

Here’s your weekly investigative briefing.

From us:

Photos reveal Russian gas tanker with heavy machine guns as Baltic tensions rise

There’s no denying it: a Russian tanker is sailing in European waters with heavy machine guns and military personnel on board. For the first time ever, newly obtained photographs clearly show the heavily armed vessel passing the coasts of Finland and the Baltic States.

What does this mean for NATO? For experts, the message from Moscow is unmistakable. “They’re effectively saying: ‘Don’t board us, because that will provoke a war.’”

This story was published in collaboration with Delfi, Dossier Center, Danwatch, NDR, WDR, Pointer, Süddeutsche Zeitung, The Times, Helsingin Sanomat, and OCCRP.

Read the article

Crime & Corruption | EU anti-fraud office keeps its black box shut

This week, FTM journalists Peter Teffer, Salsabil Fayed, and Simon Van Dorpe examined why the EU’s anti-fraud office is continuing to keep the lid closed on one of its ongoing investigations. They also looked at the EU’s efforts to bring order to the crypto industry’s “wild west”, and the latest developments in Qatargate, where prosecutors are seeking to lift the immunity of a former EU commissioner.

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From friends of FTM:

Suicide forum linked to Irish deaths remains accessible

The Journal Investigates found that a suicide forum, blocked in the UK but still accessible in Ireland, has been linked to the deaths of at least two Irish people. The site directed vulnerable users to illegal suppliers of toxic substances, including a Mexican man now in jail in the US. Bereaved families say users are being groomed into suicide. Ireland’s media regulator is reviewing the platform under the EU Digital Services Act.

How Europe’s chemical lobby slowed a toxic export ban

Danwatch investigated why the EU has yet to fulfil its 2020 promise to ban exports of pesticides that are illegal to use within the bloc. Many have been linked to cancer, fertility problems, and harm to children’s brain development. Despite this, European companies continue shipping them to dozens of countries outside the EU. The investigation suggests the long-delayed ban may now be in doubt. Brussels has increasingly adopted the position of lobby groups which say tougher rules would hurt European competitiveness.

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Until next week

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